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A Matter of National Importance: The Persistent
Inefficiency of Deceptive Advertising Class Actions

Abstract
Deceptive advertising class actions have recently become increasingly
popular. However, an examination of their functioning reveals that they are
inefficient for all parties involved: plaintiffs, defendants, and the court system itself.
In response to concern that cases of national importance were getting mired in state
courts, Congress passed the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (CAFA), a statute
that purported to streamline class action procedure. But CAFA can only do so
much in the deceptive advertising realm, where the entrenched state law nature of
the claim continues to stymie efficient and effective litigation. Settlements remain
challenging and often unsatisfying for both plaintiffs and defendants, and
continued litigation of the class action often results in duplicative litigation and
inconsistent precedent, with forum-shopping and jurisdictional manipulations a
matter of course.
In this day and age, most advertising is nationwide and most harm suffered is
thus also nationwide. This Article argues that there is therefore no reason for
deceptive advertising to remain a state cause of action. Further, deceptive
advertising is not the sort of injury that should be vindicated by class action at all,
and the field of deceptive advertising should be restored to its regulatory roots.

© 2013 Stacey M. Lantagne
* J.D., Harvard Law School; B.A., Boston College. Ms. Lantagne is currently a Westerfield fellow at
Loyola University New Orleans College of Law.

Journal of Business & Technology Law

117

A Matter of National Importance

I. Introduction
II. Deceptive Advertising as a Cause of Action
III. The Deceptive Advertising Class Action
A. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23
B. Issues with Class Actions
1. Settlement
2. Jurisdictional
C. CAFA
1. Settlement
2. Jurisdictional
IV. Deceptive Advertising Class Actions: Still Broken After CAFA
A. Settlement
B. Inconsistent Precedent
C. Statewide Classes
D. The Frailty of CAFA’s Jurisdictional Provisions
V. Fixing the Broken System
VI. Conclusion

118

Journal of Business & Technology Law

Stacey M. Lantagne

I. Introduction
Class actions have fueled debate throughout their history. Depending on who you
ask, they are either the premier vehicle for the vindication of the rights of the little
guy or a blackmail tool to extort settlements for frivolous claims.1 But whatever they
are, they are undeniably popular right now.2
Deceptive advertising class actions are no exception to the rising tide of class
action litigation.3 These class actions, however, ably illustrate how the current
system benefits no one, neither plaintiffs, defendants, nor the judiciary. Such class
actions almost universally involve national ad campaigns which, if harmful, are
surely harmful nationwide.4 However, the deceptive advertising cause of action is a
state one.5 This results in a singularly inefficient tangle of warring litigations, forumshopping, topsy-turvy incentives, and haphazard fact-finding, resulting in
inconsistent precedent and unhappy plaintiffs, defendants, and courts.6 Defendants
may frequently find themselves between a Scylla of litigating the same case dozens
of times and a Charybdis of settling the same case dozens of times; plaintiffs
frequently find themselves so indifferent to the final outcome as to not even bother
to claim their damages; and courts frequently find themselves presiding over
duplicative cases.7
This Article argues that the current system makes little sense and serves little
purpose and that deceptive advertising, as was originally supposed when it was first
conceived, should be entrusted to regulators to police. Part II examines deceptive
1. See, e.g., Lloyd Milliken, Jr., Fixing the Broken Class Action Lawsuit System, 47 RES GESTAE 19, 19 (2003)
(explaining the purpose of class actions is to make courts accessible to the “little guy” who has an issue with a
more economically powerful company); see also Stephen J. Shapiro, Applying the Jurisdictional Provisions of the
Class Action Fairness Act of 2005: In Search of a Sensible Judicial Approach, 59 BAYLOR L. REV. 77, 103 (2007)
(noting class actions “could be used to ‘blackmail’ defendants who could not risk the possible ruin of a jury
verdict into agreeing to settlements which benefited mostly the plaintiff’s counsel”).
2. See, e.g., Mandi L. Williams, The History of Daubert and its Effect on Toxic Tort Class Action
Certification, 22 REV. LITIG. 181, 200 (2003) (“Over the past decade, class actions have become increasingly
popular.”); Christopher J. Willis, Aggregation of Punitive Damages in Diversity Class Actions: Will the Real
Amount in Controversy Please Stand Up?, 30 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 775, 775 (1997) (stating the class action device is
becoming “ever more popular,” and state law class actions are increasing in frequency).
3. See, e.g., infra notes 25–26.
4. See, e.g., Worthington v. Bayer Healthcare, LLC, Nos. 11-2793 (ES), 11-3017 (ES), 11-3299 (ES), 2012
WL 1079716, at *1 (D.N.J. Mar. 30, 2012); Walewski v. ZeniMax Media, Inc., No. 6:11-cv-1178-Orl-28DAB,
2012 WL 834125, at *8 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 30, 2012).
5. See, e.g., Mazza v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 666 F.3d 581, 581 (9th Cir. 2012); Pilgrim v. Universal
Health Card, LLC, 660 F.3d 943, 945 (6th Cir. 2011); Bruno v. Eckhart Corp., 280 F.R.D. 540, 540 (C.D. Cal.
2012).
6. See William W. Schwarzer, Settlement of Mass Tort Class Actions: Order out of Chaos, 80 CORNELL L.
REV. 837, 837–38 (1995) (citing duplicative litigation activity, multiple trials, inconsistent outcomes, and
incentives to distort the operation of traditional legal processes as some of the setbacks of class actions); Vance
G. Camisa, The Constitutional Right to Solicit Potential Class Members in a Class Action, 25 GONZ. L. REV. 95, 114
(1989–90) (“This situation presents a very real opportunity for forum shopping and its attendant inequities to
play a major role in class actions.”).
7. See Schwarzer, supra note 6, at 837.
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advertising as a cause of action.8 Part III turns to the class action as a litigation
procedure.9 Part IV analyzes the ways in which deceptive advertising class actions
fail plaintiffs, defendants, and the judiciary.10 Finally, Part V considers alternatives
to the current framework, proposing that the system should return to its roots and
the regulatory scheme should suffice.11

II. Deceptive Advertising as a Cause of Action
Initially, in the realm of the shadowy historical common law from which the
Lanham Act claimed its purpose, the action of deceptive advertising was intended
to address the situation of a seller in possession of counterfeit goods who told
consumers they were bona fide goods.12 It was a slant on the “passing off” cause of
action.13 In the early years, courts kept a tight rein on the standing requirements
imposed on such causes of action, determined not to “open a Pandora’s box of
vexatious litigation.”14 As commentators have explained, “In effect, such judicial
statements really amount to saying, ‘Yes, there may be false advertising here, but
you can’t complain about it. Let the government do it.’”15
To paraphrase an old advertising campaign, deceptive advertising as a cause of
action has “come a long way,”16 both in breadth of the injury that the cause of
action captures and in the standing permitted by those suing to avenge the injury.17

8. See infra Part II.
9. See infra Part III.
10. See infra Part IV.
11. See infra Part V.
12. See J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, 5 MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 27:1 (4th ed.
2012) (“[T]his is a variation of the ancient prohibition against passing off one’s goods as the goods of
another.”); see also Lanham Act, Pub. L. No. 79–489, 60 Stat. 427 (1946) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §
1051 et seq. (2006)).
13. See MCCARTHY, supra note 12. Passing off remains a cause of action today, most often used in “cases
where defendant has made an unauthorized substitution of the goods of one manufacturer when the goods of
another manufacturer were ordered by the customer.” Id. § 1:12.
14. N.Y. & R. Cement Co. v. Coplay Cement Co., 44 F. 277, 278 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1890).
15. MCCARTHY, supra note 12, at § 27:2.
16. Stuart Elliot, The Media Business Advertising: A Possible Impact of Thomas Case, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 15,
1991, at D3 (describing the 1970s ad campaign by Philip Morris which featured confident, liberated women
smoking Virginia Slims, congratulating them with the slogan, “You've come a long way, baby”).
17. Courts, naturally, still examine standing in the context of false advertising causes of actions, and the
courts sometimes do find the case for standing to be too nebulous. See Oshana v. Coca–Cola Co., 225 F.R.D.
575, 580 (N.D. Ill. 2005) (finding no “identifiable basis for standing” in a case where membership in the class
required only the purchase of the product in question). However, such rulings are countered by opposite
outcomes in nearly identical cases. See, e.g., Johns v. Bayer Corp., 280 F.R.D. 551, 555, 560 (S.D. Cal. 2012)
(identifying as a class “all persons who purchased the Men’s Vitamins in the State of California . . . .”); In re
Ferrero Litig., 278 F.R.D. 552, 562 (S.D. Cal. 2011) (certifying a class of “all persons who … bought one or more
Nutella® products in the state of California”); Chavez v. Blue Sky Natural Beverage Co., 268 F.R.D. 365, 380
(N.D. Cal. 2010) (certifying a class where membership in the class required only the purchase of the product in
question); Nelson v. Mead Johnson Nutrition Co., 270 F.R.D. 689, 691 (S.D. Fla. 2010) (granting a motion for
Class Certification wherein the class was “[a]ll Florida consumers who purchased Enfamil® LIPIL®”); Kelly v.
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Courts no longer appear to think that the government ought to be the primary
defense against deceptive advertising.18 Indeed, the “Pandora’s box of vexatious
litigation” seems to have been quite decisively opened — and possibly as
irreversibly as that of the myth.
The history of deceptive advertising is one of expansionism. Tucked into § 43(a)
of the Lanham Act and originally envisioned “as a minor, but useful section,” the
courts’ interpretations of the section prodded it into singular importance in unfair
competition jurisprudence.19 However, standing to sue for deceptive advertising
under § 43(a) has traditionally been denied to consumers.20 Federal courts voiced
the fear that permitting consumers standing under § 43(a) “would lead to a
veritable flood of claims brought in already overtaxed federal district courts, while
adequate private remedies for consumer protection, which to date have been left
almost exclusively to the States, are readily at hand.”21 This stance left the door open
for state courts to fill the gap, fracturing deceptive advertising into dozens of
smaller battles as part of one larger war.
States became the controllers of consumer deceptive advertising causes of
action.22 Whether brought in state or federal courts, the complaints rest on state
statutes, like the California Consumer Legal Remedies Act23 or the Illinois
Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act.24 If the complaint is brought
in federal court, it is based on diversity jurisdiction, not federal question
Phiten USA, Inc., 277 F.R.D. 564, 567–69 (S.D. Iowa 2011) (receiving Class Certification on purchased products
for settlement purposes).
18. But see FTC v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 380 U.S. 374, 385 (1965) (“Moreover, as an administrative
agency which deals continually with cases in the area, the [Federal Trade] Commission is often in a better
position than are courts to determine when a practice is ‘deceptive’ . . . .”).
19. MCCARTHY, supra note 12, § 27:7; see also Lanham Act § 43(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2006).
20. See MCCARTHY, supra note 12, § 27:39; see also Lanham Act § 43(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2006).
21. Colligan v. Activities Club of N.Y., Ltd., 442 F.2d 686, 693 (2d Cir. 1971); see also Lanham Act § 43(a),
15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2006).
22. MCCARTHY, supra note 12, §§ 27:114–115 (discussing the Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act and
little Federal Trade Commission Acts). Plaintiffs have also resorted to common law unjust enrichment and
breach of warranty causes of action to vindicate their rights. See, e.g., Mazza v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 666 F.3d
581, 587 (9th Cir. 2012); Pilgrim v. Universal Health Card, LLC, 660 F.3d 943, 945 (6th Cir. 2011); Montanez v.
Gerber Childrenswear, LLC, No. CV 09-7420 DSF (DTBx), 2011 WL 6757875, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 15, 2011);
In re Ferrero, 278 F.R.D. at 556; Kelly, 277 F.R.D. at 567; Oscar v. BMW of N. Am., LLC, 274 F.R.D. 498, 502
(S.D.N.Y. 2011); Heisler v. Maxtor Corp., No. 5:06-cv-06634-JF (PSG), 2011 WL 1496114, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Apr.
20, 2011); Worthington v. Bayer Healthcare, LLC, Nos. 11-2793 (ES), 11-3017 (ES), 11-3299 (ES), 2012 WL
1079716, at *1–2 (D.N.J. Mar. 30, 2012); Wolph v. Acer Am. Corp., 272 F.R.D. 477, 481 (N.D. Cal. 2011);
Bruno v. Eckhart Corp., 280 F.R.D. 540, 543 (C.D. Cal. 2012); Walewski v. ZeniMax Media, Inc., No. 6:11-cv1178-Orl-28DAB, 2012 WL 834125, at *1 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 30, 2012); Hartless v. Clorox Co., 273 F.R.D. 630, 634
(S.D. Cal. 2011); Nelson, 270 F.R.D. at 691; Weiner v. Snapple Beverage Corp., No. 07 Civ. 8742 (DLC), 2010
WL 3119452, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 5, 2010); Fitzpatrick v. Gen. Mills, Inc., 263 F.R.D. 687, 692 (S.D. Fla. 2010);
In re Sears, Roebuck & Co. Tools Mktg. and Sales Practices Litig., Nos. 05 C 4724, 05 C 2623, 2007 WL 4287511,
at *1 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 4, 2007); Yeroushalmi v. Blockbuster Inc., No. CV 05-225-AHM (RCX), 2005 WL 2083008,
at *1 (C.D. Cal. July 11, 2005); Oshana, 225 F.R.D. at 578.
23. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1750 et seq. (West 2012).
24. 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. 505/1 et seq. (West 2012).
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jurisdiction.25 The spotlight in the field of deceptive advertising solidly belongs to
the states.
The state specific remedies for deceptive advertising stand in stark contrast to
the nationwide harm they are meant to address.26 An idea that may have seemed
logical in 1971 looks less logical by the dawning of the twenty-first century mass
media. The proposition that any one state has more of an interest than any other
state in regulating nationwide advertisements is nonsensical when the harm to
consumers stems from cohesive national ad campaigns. The corollary that
consumers in one state are harmed in a different way by the same advertisement
than consumers in any other state is equally ludicrous.
In short, the state-centric nature of consumer deceptive advertising actions feels
like a historical curiosity, a relic from a time when deceptive advertising sported a
different character altogether and was thought to be the primary preoccupation of
competitors, not consumers, intended as a backstop to government regulations.
That is no longer the case.

25. See Mazza, 666 F.3d at 589; Morgan v. Gay, 471 F.3d 469, 471 (3d Cir. 2006); Brill v. Countrywide
Home Loans, Inc., 427 F.3d 446, 447 (7th Cir. 2005); Bruno, 280 F.R.D. at 545; Gianino v. Alacer Corp., 846 F.
Supp. 2d 1096, 1100 (C.D. Cal. 2012); Walewski, 2012 WL 834125, at *4; Wolph, 272 F.R.D. at 485; In re Yasmin
and Yaz Mktg. Sales Practices and Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 3:09-md-02100-DRH-PMF, 2012 WL 865041, at *8
(S.D. Ill. Mar. 13, 2012); Hartless, 273 F.R.D. at 636; Fine v. ConAgra Foods, Inc., No. CV 10-01848 SJO
(CFOx), 2010 WL 3632469, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 26, 2010); Sanchez v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. Civ. 2:06CV-02573-JAM-KJM, 2009 WL 1514435, at *1 (E.D. Cal. May 28, 2009); Yeroushalmi, 2005 WL 2083008, at *1;
Berry v. Am. Express Publ’g Corp., 381 F. Supp. 2d 1118, 1120 (C.D. Cal. 2005); Oshana, 225 F.R.D. at 583.
26. See Guido v. L’Oreal, USA, Inc., Nos. CV 11-1067 CAS (JCx), CV 11-5465 CAS (JCx), 2012 WL
1616912, at *1, *6 (C.D. Cal. May 7, 2012) (reviewing state class certification requests by Plaintiffs seeking
remedies for injuries induced by a flammable hair styling product that had not been appropriately labeled and
was sold in large quantities across the country); Worthington, 2012 WL 1079716, at *1 (relying upon the New
Jersey Consumer Fraud Act, among other statutes, to redress a class’s deceptive advertising claim involving a
probiotic health product with a nationwide marketing campaign); Gianino, 846 F. Supp. 2d at 1099 (denying
Plaintiffs’ motion to apply California law to a class certification of plaintiffs contesting the nationwide
marketing of the product, Emergen-C); Walewski, 2012 WL 834125, at *8 (applying Florida law to a deceptive
advertising suit because Florida had a strong interest in protecting its citizens, while admitting that the
misrepresentations “could have ‘emanated’ from a variety of locations”); In re Ferrero, 278 F.R.D. at 562
(certifying a California class of persons who purchased Nutella products that had been nationally marketed as
part of a “balanced breakfast”); Kelly, 277 F.R.D. at 568 (applying California’s False Advertising Act, California’s
Unfair Competition Law, California’s Deceptive Practices Act, and Iowa’s Consumer Fraud Act to a case for
remedies wherein the product was sold across a nationwise market); Red v. Kraft Foods, Inc., No. CV 10-1028GW (AGRx), 2011 WL 4599833, at *7 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 29, 2011) (finding that Plaintiffs could not assert that
their claim was limited to activities occurring in California, and that as a result, the class could not be certified);
Fitzpatrick, 263 F.R.D. at 691 (discussing the nationwide marketing campaign to sell Yo-Plus yogurt that was
being addressed only by the Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act); In re Sears, 2007 WL 4287511 at
*1 (discussing how “Made in USA” was an inappropriate label for mostly foreign supplied Craftsman tools and
how the label was perpetuated throughout the entire country). But see Pilgrim, 660 F.3d at 948 (noting that the
ads in question were not uniform from state to state).
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III. The Deceptive Advertising Class Action
While a deceptive advertising cause of action does not have to be a class action, it is
an undeniably popular choice.27 Most state class actions resemble federal class
actions procedurally.28 In addition, even though focused on state law, many
deceptive advertising class actions are litigated in the federal court system and
therefore governed by federal procedure.29 An examination of Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 23 is thus instructive in revealing the inefficiencies of deceptive
advertising class actions.30
A. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23
The class action is supposed to be a win-win-win situation. It is supposed to
increase judicial efficiency by consolidating many cases into one, promote the
litigation of injustices that might not be worthwhile otherwise, and enable
defendants to settle common issues quickly and efficiently in one fell swoop.31 “As
one state supreme court observed, the modern class action ‘is a procedural device
that was adopted with the goals of economies of time, effort and expense,
uniformity of decisions, the promotion of efficiency and fairness in handling large
numbers of similar claims.’”32 In this way, class actions are supposed to benefit
plaintiffs, defendants, and courts themselves.
Rule 23(a) sets forth four “prerequisites” for a class action:
(1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable; (2)
there are questions of law or fact common to the class; (3) the claims or
defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of

27. This Article focuses on class actions brought for deceptive or misleading advertising, and it does not
discuss class actions relying exclusively on other causes of action, such as breach of warranty. See, e.g., Walewski,
2012 WL 834125, at *1.
28. See Stephen B. Burbank, The Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 in Historical Context: A Preliminary
View, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1439, 1500 (2008).
29. See infra Part III.A.
30. See infra Part III.A.
31. See Kalee DiFazio, Note, CAFA’s Impact on Forum Shopping and the Manipulation of the Civil Justice
System, 17 SUFFOLK J. TRIAL & APP. ADVOC. 133, 135–36 (2012); see also O’Shea v. Epson Am., Inc., No. CV 09–
8063 PSG (CWx), 2011 WL 4352458, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 19, 2011) (“Class certification is appropriate when it
‘saves the resources of both the courts and the parties by permitting an issue potentially affecting every [class
member] to be litigated in an economical fashion under Rule 23 [of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure].’”)
(quoting Gen. Tel. Co. of the Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 155 (1982)); Burbank, supra note 28, at 1487; Steven
B. Hantler et al., Is the “Crisis” in the Civil Justice System Real or Imagined?, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1121, 1137
(2005); Shapiro, supra note 1, at 79.
32. JOSEPH M. MCLAUGHLIN, MCLAUGHLIN ON CLASS ACTIONS § 1:1 (7th ed. 2010) (quoting In re W. Va.
Rezulin Litig., 585 S.E.2d 52, 62 (W. Va. 2003)).
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the class; and (4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately
protect the interests of the class.33
These prerequisites are commonly referred to as numerosity, commonality,
typicality, and adequate representation.34 Once these prerequisites have been
fulfilled, the class action then must fit into one of the three categories enumerated
by 23(b): (1) individual litigations would carry the risk of either inconsistent
judgments or the foreclosure of subsequent litigants’ rights; (2) relief is sought for
conduct that is consistent to the class as a whole; or (3) questions common to the
class predominate over individual questions and a class action would be superior
to all other methods of adjudication.35
The idea of class actions as a vehicle for litigation has existed for decades. In
1937, it was formally adopted from Equity Rule 38, which explicitly recognized
that a class action could exist where numerous persons shared a common
interest.36 Thus, the numerosity and commonality requirements are wellentrenched in American jurisprudence, although the initial motivation behind
this Rule seemed to be to make sure that unincorporated associations could sue
and be sued, despite their lack of status as a legal entity.37 The typical class action
today, brought by a loose coalition of people who have never met, is a very
different creature.
From the very beginning, class actions have enjoyed a reputation for working
better in theory than in practice. The initial incarnation of Rule 23 “proved
obscure and uncertain,” hindered by terms that proved challenging to the courts
to define and interpret.38 As a result, in 1966 the Rule was overhauled in an
attempt to add clarity and predictability to class actions. There was also concern
that the original Rule did not “assure procedural fairness,” especially when it

33. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a).
34. See, e.g., Guido v. L’Oreal, USA, Inc., Nos. CV 11-1067 CAS (JCx), CV 11-5465 CAS (JCx), 2012 WL
1616912, at *2 (C.D. Cal. May 7, 2012); In re Yasmin and Yaz Mktg. Sales Practices and Prods. Liab. Litig., No.
3:09-md-02100-DRH-PMF, 2012 WL 865041, at *14 (S.D. Ill. Mar. 13, 2012); Johns v. Bayer Corp., 280 F.R.D.
551, 555 (S.D. Cal. 2012); Montanez v. Gerber Childrenswear, LLC, No. CV 09-7420 DSF (DTBx), 2011 WL
6757875, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 15, 2011); Carrera v. Bayer Corp., No. 08-4716 (JLL), 2011 WL 5878376, at *2
(D.N.J. Nov. 22, 2011); Badella v. Deniro Mktg. LLC, No. C 10-03908 CRB, 2011 WL 5358400, *3 (N.D. Cal.
Nov. 4, 2011); Walter v. Hughes Commc’ns, Inc., No. 09-2136 SC, 2011 WL 2650711, at *6 (N.D. Cal. July 6,
2011); Hartless v. Clorox Co., 273 F.R.D. 630, 637 (S.D. Cal. 2011); Sanchez v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. Civ.
2:06-CV-02573-JAM-KJM, 2009 WL 1514435, at *1 (E.D. Cal. May 28, 2009).
35. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b).
36. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23 advisory committee’s note 1937 (2006) (note to Subdivision (a)).
37. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23 advisory committee’s note 1937 (2006) (clause (1), Joint, Common, or
Secondary Right).
38. FED. R. CIV. P. 23 advisory committee’s note 1966 (2006) (amendment difficulties with the original
rule).
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came to notification of class members.39 The 1966 amendment, by overhauling
the original Rule, intended to:
[D]escribe[] in more practical terms the occasions for maintaining class
actions; provide[] that all class actions maintained to the end as such will
result in judgments including those whom the court finds to be members of
the class, whether or not the judgment is favorable to the class; and refer[]
to the measures which can be taken to assure the fair conduct of these
actions.40
B. Issues with Class Actions
1. Settlement
Despite these amendments, problems — whether real or perceived — persisted
with class actions. For one thing, there was a perception that for the majority of the
time class actions only benefited plaintiffs’ attorneys, who collected enormous fees
from settlements.41 Indeed, some plaintiffs’ attorneys form their entire practice
around the bringing of such class actions.42 In many cases, the perceived goal is not

39. Id.
40. Id.
41. See Nan S. Ellis, The Class Action Fairness Act of 2005: The Story Behind the Statute, 35 J. LEGIS. 76, 76
(2009) (“[Class actions] contribute to the skyrocketing number of lawsuits filed. Given the small amount that
each individual plaintiff has at stake in the lawsuit, no one benefits but the lawyers who bring the lawsuits. They
are viewed as nothing more than ‘money generators’ for lawyers.”); see also Sanchez v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.,
No. Civ. 2:06-CV-02573-JAM-KJM, 2009 WL 1514435, at *4 (E.D. Cal. May 28, 2009) (“[T]he only persons
likely to benefit from a class action in this case are class counsel . . . .”).
42. See, e.g., Oshana v. Coca–Cola Co., 225 F.R.D. 575, 583 (N.D. Ill. 2005) (noting that proposed class
counsel had “prosecuted hundreds of class actions”). Some courts have issued sharp criticisms of plaintiffs’
attorneys who drive the class action litigations instead of soliciting the plaintiffs active involvement. See In re
Yasmin and Yaz Mktg. Sales Practices and Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 3:09-md-02100-DRH-PMF, 2012 WL 865041,
at *17–18 (S.D. Ill. Mar. 13, 2012) (finding a named plaintiff to be an inadequate representative because she was
a close friend of class counsel’s, who recruited her to the litigation); Red v. Kraft Foods, Inc., No. CV 10-1028GW (AGRx), 2011 WL 4599833, at *13 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 29, 2011) (“Defendants correctly note that there is at
least some basis for concern about whether Plaintiffs are ‘not simply lending [their] name to a suit controlled
entirely by the class attorney.’” (quoting Beck v. Status Game Corp., 89 Civ. 2923, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9978,
at *16 (S.D.N.Y. July 13, 1995) (quoting 7A Wright, Miller & Kane, Federal Practice & Procedure § 1766 (2d ed.
1986)))); id. at *13 (“Both Plaintiffs in their depositions exhibited a lack of familiarity with the case. Both
testified they did not understand the differences between the original complaint and the SAC or why the
changes were made.”); Sanchez, 2009 WL 1514435, at *3 (“Such a ‘cart before the horse’ approach to litigation is
not the proper mechanism for the vindication of legal rights.”). This criticism perhaps reflects a concern that
unsavory practices might be underway. See Red, 2011 WL 4599833, at *14 (“Much more troubling than this,
they also note that The Weston Firm's former co-counsel testified under oath that Mr. Weston had (1) offered a
‘kickback’ to an employee's roommate in return for serving as a named plaintiff in a class action; (2) promised a
‘finder's fee’ to his employee in return for ‘signing up’ her roommate as a named plaintiff; and (3) agreed to
compensate the firm's non-lawyer employees with settlement proceeds on a percentage basis.”). However,
others appear unconcerned by the practice. See O’Shea v. Epson Am., Inc., No. CV 09–8063 PSG (CWx), 2011
WL 4352458, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 19, 2011). Additionally, there have been unsavory accusations sometimes
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to litigate but to extract a settlement with a generous provision for attorneys’ fees.43
“[C]onventional wisdom is that class actions are ‘Frankenstein monsters’ whose
very existence allows plaintiffs to engage in judicial blackmail inducing defendants
to settle frivolous claims.”44 Even if the claims were legitimate, too often, the story
was that class members received mere pennies or coupons of little to no value,
which they seldom even bothered to collect.45
2. Jurisdictional
In addition to no longer benefitting consumers and being seen as tools of
jurisprudential blackmail,46 class actions were also perceived as encouraging
jurisdictional games that prejudiced defendants and represented a drag on judicial
efficiency.47 There was concern that these jurisdictional games were causing cases of
national importance to get trapped in state court, leading to states exercising undue
amounts of influence over injuries that were truly nationwide in scope.48 This was a
singularly inefficient way to adjudicate in a court system founded on stare decisis:
courts got caught up in sticky questions of issue and claim preclusion49 and
defendants found themselves serially addressing the issues at hand.50 Such was
lobbied at plaintiffs’ class action law firms. See, e.g., Pre-Paid Legal Servs. Inc. v. Gilmer Law Firm, 260 Fed.
Appx. 731 (5th Cir. 2007) (reviewing the action of a class action law firm wherein the lawyers were accused of
tortuous interference with a business relationship).
43. See Hantler et al., supra note 31, at 1137 (“Over time, class actions have become the equivalent of
high-stakes litigation poker. The potential costs of losing often force companies to fold their hands and settle
rather than call the plaintiffs’ lawyer’s bluff.”); MCLAUGHLIN, supra note 32, at § 1:3 (“Class actions are an
attractive option for plaintiffs’ lawyers’ for the same reason that they pose a tremendous hazard to defendants—
the consolidation of numerous claims into one action multiplies the potential damages award, often to a figure
so large that it exerts irresistible pressure on defendants to agree to substantial settlements for claims that they
would be willing to litigate to judgment if the liability risk were less daunting.”); Shapiro, supra note 1, at 78,
103. But see Anna Andreeva, Class Action Fairness Act of 2005: The Eight-Year Saga Is Finally Over, 59 U. MIAMI
L. REV. 385, 404 (Apr. 2005) (“This argument, however, does not account for the existence of Rule 11
protections against frivolous lawsuits. If the defendants are correct in saying that too many class
actions nowadays are ‘meritless,’ then why don’t they simply utilize a motion to dismiss to eliminate frivolous
class actions? Moreover, if a suit is frivolous, it will not survive a Rule 11 motion whether it was filed in a state
or a federal court.”) (internal citations omitted).
44. Ellis, supra note 41, at 76 (internal citations omitted).
45. See id. at 92; Howard M. Erichson, CAFA’s Impact on Class Action Lawyers, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1593,
1599 (2008); Walter v. Hughes Commc’ns, Inc., No. 09-2136 SC, 2011 WL 2650711, at *13 (N.D. Cal. July 6,
2011).
46. See Shapiro, supra note 1, at 103.
47. See DiFazio, supra note 31, at 133; see also Ellis, supra note 41, at 89 (calling class actions the
“messiest” part of the judicial system); Erichson, supra note 45, at 1596–97; Shapiro, supra note 1, at 78, 80, 103,
136.
48. See Andreeva, supra note 43, at 388; Milliken, supra note 1, at 19.
49. See Burbank, supra note 28, at 1509 (“Contemporary class action practice seems to confound the basic
assumptions of preclusion law by preferring multiple cases to just one.”); MCLAUGHLIN, supra note 32, at § 1:1.
50. See DiFazio, supra note 31, at 133, 142; see also 151 CONG. REC. H735 (daily ed. Feb. 17, 2005)
(statement of Rep. Cannon); Andreeva, supra note 43, at 394 (“[T]he filing of a single class action in a state
court often leads to a number of ‘copycat’ cases being filed in other jurisdictions.”) (citing 151 CONG. REC.
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especially the case in deceptive advertising class action lawsuits, which, although
typically involving a nationwide issue, orbited around disjointed state law.
Because of the state law nature of deceptive advertising, in order for a deceptive
advertising consumer class action to be brought in federal court and to be subject to
Rule 23, diversity jurisdiction has to be satisfied. Traditionally, this required the
satisfaction of two elements: (1) diversity of citizenship between the plaintiffs and
the defendants, and (2) an amount in controversy higher than the statutorily
defined minimum.51 In the case of a class action, these elements could be easily
thwarted. The federal requirement of complete diversity meant that clever plaintiffs’
attorneys could defeat federal jurisdiction merely by choosing a named plaintiff
with the same citizenship as one of the defendants.52 Because of the national breadth
of the advertising campaigns at issue, this does not normally present a hurdle.
Furthermore, because of the decentralized nature of the individual harm present in
a class action, it was a simple matter for plaintiffs’ attorneys to assert that none of
the plaintiffs’ claims ever met the requisite amount in controversy, which was
generally set high enough to ensure that minor disputes did not clutter the federal
court system.53 Finally, because diversity jurisdiction was traditionally intended to
prevent out-of-state defendants from being victimized by an unfamiliar court
system,54 defendants are not allowed to remove a case that would otherwise satisfy
the diversity jurisdiction requirements if the case is brought in a defendants’ home
state.55 For this reason, plaintiffs’ attorneys could defeat federal jurisdiction by filing
in the state court of the defendant’s citizenship.56 Again, because of the nationwide
sprawl of the harm, consumer deceptive advertising class actions are generally
intensely flexible cases.57 Forum-shopping state courts is a fairly easy task in this
context.58
S1248-49 (2005) (statement of Sen. Frist)); Burbank, supra note 28, at 1509; Timothy Kerr, Cleaning Up One
Mess to Create Another: Duplicative Class Actions, Federal Courts’ Injunctive Power, and the Class Action Fairness
Act of 2005, 29 HAMLINE L. REV. 217, 219 (2006); Milliken, supra note 1, at 19–20.
51. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2006) (providing the statutory requirements for diversity jurisdiction).
52. See Burbank, supra note 28, at 1517–18; DiFazio, supra note 31, at 140–41; Shapiro, supra note 1, at
81.
53. See DiFazio, supra note 31, at 141; see also Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546,
549 (2005) (holding that if one plaintiff meets the amount-in-controversy requirement then supplemental
jurisdiction can be had over the claims of other plaintiffs); Shapiro, supra note 1, at 81 (explaining that only
minimal complete diversity is required in class actions).
54. See Burbank, supra note 28, at 1460; Ellis, supra note 41, at 108.
55. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) (2006).
56. See id.; Burbank, supra note 28, at 1517–18; DiFazio, supra note 31, at 141.
57. See, e.g., Walewski v. ZeniMax Media, Inc., No. 6:11–cv–1178–Orl–28DAB, 2012 WL 834125, at *8
(M.D. Fla. Jan. 30, 2012) (noting that, because defendant did business nationwide, “the alleged
misrepresentations or omissions to any particular member of the purported class could have ‘emanated’ from a
variety of locations”).
58. Evidence of such activities can be gleaned from the unusual amount of class actions filed in some state
courts as opposed to others. See Ellis, supra note 41, at 93 (“An example of one such jurisdiction is Madison
County, Illinois. Citing the large numbers of class actions filed even where there is no evidence that the
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C. CAFA
With class actions exploding as a litigation vehicle,59 the Class Action Fairness Act of
2005 (CAFA) sought to address both the perceived issues of unfair settlements and
jurisdictional shortcomings.60
1. Settlement
As far as the allegedly unfair settlements went, CAFA provided judges with
assistance in their required evaluation of settlements.61 In order to make sure that
class actions do not devolve into collusion between defendants’ and plaintiffs’
attorneys at the expense of the class’s interest, Rule 23 has always required court
approval for settlements.62 The court must determine that the settlement is “fair,
reasonable, and adequate” in order for such settlement to be acceptable.63 Rule 23
does not specify further what the court’s gatekeeper function in this respect is,64 but
in practice courts tend to review settlements to make sure they are “fair, reasonable,
and adequate” for the class, rather than for all of the parties involved in the
litigation.65 CAFA provided more guidance in some respects, especially with regard

residents of that county are ‘somehow cursed or more plagued by injuries than the average citizen,’ one
Congressman suggested that the only reasonable explanation was ‘aggressive forum shopping by trial lawyers to
find courts and judges who will act as willing accomplices in a judicial power grab, hearing nationwide cases
and setting policy for the entire country.’” (referencing Andreeva, supra note 43, at 394 (statement of Rep.
Sensenbrenner))). The number of class actions filed against Fortune 500 companies in state courts increased by
more than 1,000% in the 1990s, as opposed to a 338% increase in federal courts. See Hantler et al., supra note
31, at 1137 (noting that this “reflect[ed] the belief that plaintiffs are more likely to obtain and prevail on
questionable class actions in state courts”); see also Ellis, supra note 41, at 92 (noting the perception that state
courts are more likely to certify a class).
59. See Hantler et al., supra note 31, at 1137 (noting the significant increase of class actions in the 1990’s).
60. See S. REP. NO. 109–14, at 4 (2005) (acknowledging the purpose of diversity jurisdiction and the abuse
of class action settlements).
61. See Ellis, supra note 41, at 105–07 (discussing the new mechanisms and requirements for judicial
evaluation of settlements).
62. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e) (2006); Kerr, supra note 50, at 219 (“Class counsel may collude with
defendants and their attorneys, against class interests, in order to increase their prospects of being the lucky
attorney to collect fees, and, thus allow defendants forum-shopping opportunities.”); id. at 224–25.
63. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(2).
64. Even the committee notes accompanying the initial implementation of this rule provided no guidance
for the curious court, stating simply, “subdivision (e) requires approval of the court, after notice, for the
dismissal or compromise of any class action.” FED. R. CIV. P. 23 advisory committee’s note 1966 (2006)
(Subdivision (d)). The 2003 committee notes attempt to expand on this, suggesting that the court look to In re
Prudential Ins. Co. Am. Sales Practice Litig. Agent Actions, 148 F.3d 283, 316–24 (3d Cir. 1988), and the
Manual for Complex Litigation for guidance, Fed. Judicial Centr., Manual for Complex Litig. 172 (Judge Stanley
Marcus et al. eds., 4th ed. 2004). FED. R. CIV. P. 23 advisory committee’s note 2003 (2006) (Committee Notes of
Rules- 2003 Amendment, Paragraph (1)).
65. See Hartless v. Clorox Co., 273 F.R.D. 630, 636 (S.D. Cal. 2011) (“In approving a class action
settlement, a district court must ensure fairness to all members of the class presented for certification.”
(emphasis added) (citing Staton v. Boeing Co., 327 F.3d 938, 952 (9th Cir. 2003))); Kelly v. Phiten USA, Inc.,
277 F.R.D. 564, 570 (S.D. Iowa 2011) (“When making this determination, ‘the district court acts as a fiduciary,
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to the coupon settlements that had attracted the most ire prior to CAFA.66 CAFA
also limited or prohibited other types of settlement (e.g., so-called “net loss”
settlements in which the plaintiffs had to pay class counsel a fee that resulted in a
net loss, and settlements where geography dictated recovery amounts).67 Finally,
CAFA established requirements to notify government officials of the settlement,
introducing an additional “layer of independent oversight” beyond the court.68
2. Jurisdictional
As for jurisdiction, CAFA expanded federal jurisdiction to include class actions,
attempting to close the loopholes that plaintiffs’ attorneys had been wiggling
through.69 Among other things, federal courts could now exercise jurisdiction over
any class action suit where the amount in controversy exceeded $5 million,
regardless of the amount of individual harm to each class member, as long as the
class had over one hundred members.70 If a single plaintiff was diverse from any of
the defendants, then diversity jurisdiction was satisfied, so it no longer mattered if
plaintiffs’ attorneys tried to get clever with named plaintiffs.71 CAFA also permitted
a defendant to remove class actions from state courts even if they had been filed in
the defendant’s state of citizenship.72

IV. Deceptive Advertising Class Actions:
Still Broken After CAFA
If class actions were broken before CAFA, then deceptive advertising class actions,
at least, remain broken in CAFA’s wake. CAFA’s clarification of settlement scrutiny
does not strip class action settlement of the unique challenges it presents — or
eliminate the perception that class actions are used as a blackmail tool to extort
money for frivolous claims. And CAFA’s attempt to expand federal jurisdiction
serving as a guardian of the rights of absent class members.’” (quoting In re Wireless Tel. Fed. Cost Recovery
Fees Litig., 396 F.3d 922, 932 (8th Cir. 2005))).
66. See Ellis, supra note 41, at 105.
67. See id. at 106.
68. Id. at 106–07.
69. See Yeroushalmi v. Blockbuster Inc., No. CV 05–223–AHM (RCX), 2005 WL 2083008, at *5 (C.D. Cal.
July 11, 2005) (“This result is further supported by the Senate Judiciary Committee’s direction that ‘[when] a
federal court is uncertain about whether “all matters in controversy” in a purported class action “do not in the
aggregate exceed the sum or value of $5,000,000,” the court should err in favor of exercising jurisdiction over
the case.’” (quoting S. REP. NO. 102–14, at *42 (1991), reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4, 40)); see also id. at *2
(noting that allegations specifically to circumvent jurisdiction were the target of CAFA). CAFA also maintains a
number of exceptions to federal jurisdiction over class actions, meant to ensure that truly state-specific class
actions remain in state court. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(4) (2006). These are of limited relevance to the topic of
this Article.
70. See Shapiro, supra note 1, at 81–82 (noting the change in the amount in controversy requirement).
71. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332(d)(2), (d)(5) (2006); DiFazio, supra note 31, at 134; Ellis, supra note 41, at 101;
Shapiro, supra note 1, at 81.
72. See DiFazio, supra note 31, at 142; Erichson, supra note 45, at 1598; Shapiro, supra note 1, at 82.
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cannot correct the underlying difficulty of trying to redress a nationwide harm with
a state statute, which results in inconsistent precedents, inefficient statewide classes,
and continued jurisdictional shenanigans.73
CAFA was intended to improve the functioning of the class action, making it, as
it was always supposed to be, a win-win-win for all involved.74 However, deceptive
advertising class actions have continued to operate against the best interests of
plaintiffs, defendants, and courts.75
A. Settlement
Settlements, far more frequently than class actions, often achieve the win-win-win
situation that class actions are supposed to achieve: an acceptable outcome to both
plaintiffs and defendants while unclogging busy courts.76 And the particular quirks
of class actions initially make settlement look particularly inviting for both plaintiffs
and defendants.77 Class actions are inherently more complex than an ordinary
lawsuit, requiring much more labor over the course of the litigation and therefore
higher litigation costs than a regular case.78 Judgments against defendants can be
enormous.79 Plaintiffs’ attorneys, meanwhile, frequently do not get paid unless they
win and may therefore be facing a huge monetary loss if they take a case to trial and
fail to win.80 Moreover, because the act of class certification inevitably spurs some
analysis of the merits of the case, there is an incentive for both sides to settle as
quickly as possible, before the case cements itself in the brain of the judge as
particularly weak or strong, based only on preliminary impressions.81

73. See infra Parts IV.B–D.
74. See Emery G. Lee III & Thomas E. Willging, The Impact of the Class Action Fairness Act on the Federal
Courts: An Empirical Analysis of Filings and Removals, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1723, 1734 (2008) (discussing the
benefits to both plaintiffs and defendants under CAFA).
75. See infra Part V.
76. Christopher R. Leslie, De Facto Detrebling: The Rush to Settlement in Antitrust Class Action Litigation,
50 ARIZ. L. REV. 1009, 1012 (2008) (“Judges and litigants generally view settlement as a win-win outcome.”).
77. Id. at 1012–13 (discussing the purported benefits of settlement).
78. See, e.g., Mac R. McCoy et al., Nature of the Beast: Recurrent Ethical Issues Confronting Attorneys
Attempting to Settle Florida Class Actions, 86 FLA. B.J. 36, 36 (2012) (citing InPhyNet Contracting Servs., Inc. v.
Soria, 33 So. 3d 766, 771 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010)).
79. See Hantler et al., supra note 31, at 1138 (“[T]he aggregation of claims increases both the likelihood
that a defendant will be found liable and the size of any damages award that may result.”).
80. Janet Cooper Alexander, Contingent Fees and Class Actions, 47 DEPAUL L. REV. 347, 347–48 (1998)
(discussing contingent fees in class action suits).
81. While courts pay lip service to this not being the case, see Badella v. Deniro Mktg. LLC, No. C10–
03908 CRB, 2011 WL 5358400, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 4, 2011) (“Motions for class certification should not
become occasions for examining the merits of the case.”); Red v. Kraft Foods, Inc., No. CV 10-1028-GW
(AGRX), 2011 WL 4599833, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 29, 2011) (“In determining whether a plaintiff has met his
burden of demonstrating that each element of Rule 23 has been satisfied, the Court generally does not consider
the merits of plaintiff's claims.”); Oshana v. Coca–Cola Co., 225 F.R.D. 575, 580 (N.D. Ill. 2005) (“In general,
the court must not consider the merits of the case.”); Yumul v. Smart Balance, Inc., No. CV 10-00927 MMM
(AJWx), 2011 WL 1045555, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 14, 2011), it is nonetheless true that merits are discussed. See,
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Class action settlements, however, even after CAFA, distort the functioning of
the system. While a usual settlement takes place with no admission of liability and
no real public stigma, courts view all class action settlements from the starting point
of a guilty defendant.82 Courts are concerned with the protection of the class
interest, which presupposes that the class has an interest at all.83 While courts do
take into account the strength of the case when evaluating the settlement,84 without
the benefit of full fact-finding, courts are more inclined to give the class the benefit
of the doubt rather than approve an unfair settlement negotiated solely with
attorneys’ fees in mind.85 Furthermore, when the settlement takes place prior to
class certification — which a defendant may desire in order to keep litigation costs

e.g., Jermyn v. Best Buy Stores, LP, 276 F.R.D. 167, 172 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (noting that a class certification would
have occurred in another case if there had been “some proof” of an alleged policy, and contrasting that with the
case in front of it, in which plaintiffs “presented significant (indeed, ample) proof that the illegal policy alleged
in fact exists”); Oscar v. BMW of N. Am., LLC, 274 F.R.D. 498, 505 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (remarking that plaintiff
had failed to demonstrate why the product in question was defective, but then noting that it did not need to
make that merits determination at that time). The courts have acknowledged that a class certification inquiry
necessarily involves an “overlap” with the merits of the case. Guido v. L’Oreal, USA, Inc., Nos. CV 11–1067
CAS (JCx), CV 11-5465 (JCx) 2012 WL 1616912, at *3 (C.D. Cal. May 7, 2012); In re Heartland Payment Sys.,
Inc. Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 851 F. Supp. 2d 1040, 1051 (S.D. Tex. 2012); In re Ferrero Litig., 278
F.R.D. 552, 557 (S.D. Cal. 2011); Schramm v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., No. LA CV09–09442 JAK (FFMx),
2011 WL 5034663, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 19, 2011) (quoting Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, No. 10-277 U.S. 1,
slip op. at 10, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011)); Yumul, 2011 WL 1045555, at *4. In fact, at least one court has flatly
admitted,
[T]he merits of the class members’ substantive claims are often highly relevant when
determining whether to certify a class. More importantly, it is not correct to say a district court
may consider the merits to the extent that they overlap with class certification issues; rather, a
district court must consider the merits if they overlap with [sic] Rule 23 (a) requirements.
Johns v. Bayer Corp., 280 F.R.D. 551, 555 (S.D. Cal. 2012) (quoting Ellis v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 657 F.3d
970, 981 (9th Cir. 2011)) (emphasis in original).
82. See In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litig., 556 F. Supp. 1117, 1125–26 (S.D. Tex. 1982), aff'd, 687
F.2d 52 (5th Cir. 1982) (“The proposed settlement is a compromise of disputed claims, but this compromise
does not imply that Mead or any of the other defendants in this litigation are liable for the claims made by the
plaintiffs.”); see also Raymark Indus., Inc. v. Stemple, No. 88-1014-K, 1990 WL 72588, at *22 n.7 (D. Kan. May
30, 1990) (“In addition, the Kansas Supreme Court has recently recognized that although a consent judgment
(which is very similar to the type of settlement agreement at issue in this case) is construed largely as a contract,
it is enforced like an order.”).
83. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(4) (2006) (stating the representative parties will protect the interests of a
potential class).
84. See, e.g., In re Bluetooth Headset Products Liab. Litig., 654 F.3d 935, 946 (9th Cir. 2011); Hartless v.
Clorox Co., 273 F.R.D. 630, 639 (S.D. Cal. 2011); In re Ky. Grilled Chicken Coupon Mktg. & Sales Practices
Litig., 280 F.R.D. 364, 375 (N.D. Ill. 2011). In practice, this examination is necessarily brief and perfunctory, it
sometimes last no more than a few sentences. See, e.g., Hartless, 273 F.R.D. at 639–40 (discussing the merits of
the class action for the purpose of settlement).
85. See Hartless, 273 F.R.D. at 639–40 (discussing a judge’s unwillingness to approve a settlement for fear
of attorney collusion and because she was concerned that there was significant risk to the plaintiff class in
accepting settlement).
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as low as possible — the scrutiny of the settlement is even more severe.86 As wellintentioned as this system is, it places all parties involved in unusual, less than
desirable positions. It forces both defendant and plaintiff to frankly expose case
weaknesses in an effort to win court approval, and forces a court to preside in
judgment over a case based on limited information. It places defendant in a
position of arguing in favor of class certification that it would otherwise oppose,
leading to possible inconsistent stances if the settlement is refused. It rewards a class
with recovery that it might not otherwise be entitled to, and it casts suspicion and
doubt on what might be a perfectly respectable settlement.
For instance, in In re Bluetooth Headset Products Liability Litigation, the appellate
court expressed concern that an attorneys’ fees award of $800,000 was possibly
87
inappropriate when the class’s total recovery was only $100,000. However, in a
non-class-action case, it would not necessarily be unusual for attorneys’ fees to
stretch into the high six figures and for settlement to be much less if the plaintiffs’
case was weak.88 In Bluetooth, among other cases, collusion was suspected merely
because of the extra scrutiny given to class action settlements.89 Indeed, in Bluetooth,
the district court had concluded, “[P]laintiffs’ case was not particularly strong in
light of defendants’ significant defenses.”90 What would otherwise have been an
unremarkable settlement was twisted into suspicious activity.
Even more illustrative is the case of Walter v. Hughes Communications, Inc.91 In
Walter, Plaintiffs sued on behalf of a class, claiming violations of California’s
Consumer Legal Remedies Act, California’s Unfair Competition Law, negligent
misrepresentation, and intentional misrepresentation and omission.92 The
accusations were based on the allegation that Defendant had misrepresented the
Internet speeds that its subscribers would receive.93 The parties presented a
proposed settlement to the court for approval, which the court denied — twice.94
The first time the court rejected the settlement summarily, noting that it had not
received vital information it needed to assess the settlement.95 The second time, the
86. See In re Bluetooth, 654 F.3d at 946; Hartless, 273 F.R.D. at 639 (“Courts require a higher standard of
fairness when settlement takes place prior to class certification to ensure class counsel and defendant have not
colluded in settling the case.”); Walter v. Hughes Commc’ns, Inc., No. 09-2136 SC, 2011 WL 2650711, at *11
(N.D. Cal. July 6, 2011).
87. See In re Bluetooth, 654 F.3d at 945.
88. See Danielle M. Shelton, Rewriting Rule 68: Realizing the Benefits of the Federal Settlement Rule by
Injecting Certainty Into Offers of Judgment, 91 MINN. L. REV. 865, 868 (2007) (discussing six figure attorney’s fees
when settlement amounts are substantially lower).
89. In re Bluetooth, 654 F.3d at 946.
90. Id.
91. Walter, 2011 WL 2650711, at *1.
92. Id. at *3.
93. Id. at *2.
94. Id. at *1.
95. See Order Den. Mot. for Settlement at 2–3, Walter v. Hughes Commc’ns, Inc., 2011 WL 2650711
(N.D. Cal. Feb. 3, 2011) (No. 09-2136 SC), at *2.
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court expressed skepticism that a nationwide class could be certified, pointing to
several defects in Plaintiffs’ counsel’s papers.96 The court went on, however, to
discuss the fairness and adequacy of the settlement, and admitted point-blank that
the structure of the settlement was such that it was forced to assume “the role of
class advocate.”97 In this way, the court drew scathing conclusions about the
structure of a settlement that was actually fairly standard for this sort of class action:
an alteration to Defendant’s advertising and treatment of its customers, the offer of
a minor refund, and a release from all claims against Defendant.98 Indeed, in many
ways the settlement was more favorable to the class than other settlements.99
Defendant’s change to its business methods was significant,100 and the refunds
stretched as high as $40.101 So, for instance, faced with a similar settlement proposal
— a nominal amount of money for each plaintiff who files a claim and some
changes to the advertising in question — the court in Kelly v. Phiten USA, Inc.
approved it,102 displaying skepticism for the ability of the class to win at trial.103 The
court in In re Kentucky Grilled Chicken Coupon Marketing and Sales Practices
Litigation approved a settlement proposal that, at the most, allowed $15.96 in
recovery to Plaintiffs.104 In fact, the court in In re Heartland Payment Systems, Inc.
Customer Data Security Breach Litigation also allowed a settlement that resulted in
96. See Walter, 2011 WL 2650711, at *7–10. Indeed, the court’s disdain for plaintiffs’ counsel motion was
such that the court expressed doubts as to the adequacy of plaintiffs’ counsel:
Plaintiffs allege that “Plaintiffs and putative class members are represented by extremely
qualified counsel with extensive collective experience prosecuting complex consumer class
actions cases of this nature.” Pls.’ Supp. Br. at 16. The Court has reviewed the curriculum vitae
submitted and sees no issue with the qualification and experience of Plaintiffs’ counsel.
However, the Court finds that Plaintiffs’ counsel’s work on this Motion speaks volumes, and the
Court is not convinced by this work that Plaintiffs’ counsel would adequately represent the class.
Id. at *9.
97. Id. at *12.
98. See id. at *4–6.
99. Compare id. at *5, with In re Heartland Payment Sys., Inc. Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 851 F.
Supp. 2d 1040, 1080 (S.D. Tex. 2012).
100. See Walter, 2011 WL 2650711, at *1 (discussing the injunctive relief afforded to the plaintiffs).
101. Id. at *4.
102. Kelly v. Phiten USA, Inc., 277 F.R.D. 564, 568 (S.D. Iowa 2011).
103. Id. at 570 (“Based upon the record before the Court, it is clear that the Settlement Class Members
faced significant risks in adjudicating their claims. The possibility of a large monetary recovery through future
litigation is highly speculative, and any such recovery would occur only after considerable additional delay.
Specifically, the Settlement Class Members would have faced challenges by the Defendant regarding their
eligibility for class certification due to choice of law limitations, diversity complications, and arbitration
agreements. Additionally, they faced the burden of proving falsity and damages, and the litigation would likely
have been long and costly, as Defendant has capable counsel at its disposal and intended to challenge nearly
every aspect of Settlement Class Members’ case. Were the Settlement Class Members to receive a favorable trial
verdict, they still would have faced costly and lengthy appeals, delaying the receipt of benefits.”) (internal
citations omitted).
104. 280 F.R.D. 364, 373 (N.D. Ill. 2011). Indeed, the court called it “excellent results for the Settlement
Class.” Id. at 371.
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minimal recovery for Plaintiffs, and which was noteworthy mostly for the fact that
one member of the class objected that the settlement was unfair to the Defendant
because most of the class members were not harmed,105 an assertion borne out by
the extraordinarily low claim rate of eleven total from a class of over 100 million.106
The Walter court, however, was not pleased with this unremarkable settlement
proposal. It concluded that the claim process was too difficult, the wording of the
release too confusing, and that it was unlikely many consumers would bother to
make claims.107 While the court may indeed have been correct on all of these points,
the thing to note is that a small amount of claims is only a bad thing if the defendant
is guilty as charged.108 Try to imagine a defendant settling a case like this by doing
anything other than whole-heartedly admitting wrongdoing. It becomes impossible.
The court would not approve any settlement less effective than scorched earth. A
class action necessarily requires a settlement that gets something for the class,
regardless of the merits of the underlying action. This is especially striking in this
particular case, which contains an internal contradiction: the court is skeptical that
this class action can even be brought — and no doubt under normal circumstances
the defendant might agree — but at the same time deems the settlement unfair to
the class — a class it has already admitted it doubts even exists. CAFA’s increased
detail regarding settlements has not prevented confusing, inconsistent results such
as this.
To escape the complications of court approval and to save defendant from
having to take an unwanted stance on class certification it might not want to take,
the parties could settle without court approval by foregoing certification of the
109
class. Court approval of settlements is only necessary when a class is involved. If
the named parties settle the case without ever certifying a class, there is no need for
court approval.110 However, doing this would likely defeat the objective of both

105. 851 F. Supp. 2d 1040, 1050 (S.D. Tex. 2012).
106. Id. at 1047. While this case was not a deceptive advertising case, it is nonetheless interesting for its
settlement analysis.
107. Walter v. Hughes Commc’ns, Inc., No. 09-2136 SC, 2011 WL 2650711, at *15–16 (N.D. Cal. July 6,
2011). The lack of interest in making claims is an ongoing problem in class actions. See, e.g., In re Heartland
Payment Sys., 851 F. Supp. 2d at 1047 (noting that only eleven claims were filed from a class of over one
hundred million people, “[d]espite a vigorous notice campaign”).
108. See Williams v. ConAgra Poultry Co., 378 F.3d 790, 797 (8th Cir. 2004) (“Where there has been a
pattern of illegal conduct resulting in harm to a large group of people, our system has mechanisms such as class
action suits for punishing defendants.”).
109. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e). But see In re Leslie Fay Cos., 168 B.R. 294, 305 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1994)
(“Compromises may not be made in bankruptcy absent notice and a hearing and a court order.”); In re
Rothwell, 159 B.R. 374, 379 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1993) (“A settlement agreement [in bankruptcy] is unenforceable
without notice of the settlement to creditors or a court order approving it.”).
110. Although, even pre-certification, it is suggested that counsel must reach a settlement that is “fair,
reasonable, and adequate” for the class. FED. R. CIV. P. 23 advisory committee’s note, 2003 (2006) (Subdivision
(e)).
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parties in reaching the settlement.111 First, with a settlement, a defendant seeks to get
rid of a lawsuit while limiting its financial exposure in doing so.112 If the class is not
certified for purposes of the settlement, then the settlement only settles the claims
of the named plaintiffs.113 The rest of the class members have not had their interests
addressed in any way.114 The failure to certify the class for settlement exposes the
defendant to serial plaintiffs bringing cases against it for the same harm and forces a
defendant to have to beat class certification not just once but several times,
increasing overall costs.115
For instance, in Zapka v. Coca-Cola Co., the court refused to certify a class.116
Defendant settled the suit, now merely an individual one.117 Defendant then found
itself facing a brand new proposed class action, based on the same allegedly
deceptive conduct, seeking relief under the same statute.118 Defendant argued the
new class action was precluded by the Zapka class certification denial.119 The court
found, however, that “in some circumstances denial of class certification may be
given estoppel effect,” but not in all circumstances.120 The court noted that the new
case was attempting to correct the problems of the Zapka case, and found that
collateral estoppel did not apply.121 Thus, the denial of class certification in Zapka
exposed Defendant, who settled the case, to more litigation. It may have been in
Defendant’s best interest not to fight class certification and instead to settle on a
classwide basis.
111. See, e.g., Burbank, supra note 28, at 1497–98 (describing the act of settling a class action as “a vehicle
by which plaintiffs could secure prompt relief at less cost and mass tort defendants could receive a
comprehensive resolution of a litigation problem that might otherwise consume years, if not decades” and
adding that “[f]or defendants seeking ‘global peace,’ the settlement class action seemed just the thing”); Staton
v. Boeing Co., 327 F.3d 938, 964 (9th Cir. 2003) (“[A] defendant is interested only in disposing of the total
claim asserted against it.”) (citation omitted).
112. See, e.g., Leslie, supra note 76, at 1012 (“[S]ettlement brings certainty to an inherently uncertain
process. All interested parties seek repose: defendants want to minimize their exposure. . . . A settlement
guarantees that defendants will not face bankrupting liability. . . .”); see also id. at 1012 n.6 (“‘Another potential
problem is that by aggregating hundreds of thousands and sometimes millions of small claims, class counsel can
threaten defendants with exposure so great that they are reluctant to take the risk of going to trial even if they
believe they have good defenses; even a small risk of a very large loss may be one the defendant is unwilling to
take.’” (quoting DAVID BOIES, COURTING JUSTICE: FROM NY YANKEES v. MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL TO BUSH V.
GORE, 1997–2000 229 (2004))).
113. See 32B AM. JUR. 2D Federal Courts § 1595 (“Where a plaintiff’s stake in the controversy disappears
before there has been an effort to certify the class action, the action must be dismissed as moot even if it is
capable of repetition but evading review.”).
114. Id. § 1595 n.1 (“A federal court should normally dismiss a putative class action as moot when the
named plaintiff settles its individual claim and the district court has not certified a class.”).
115. See DiFazio, supra note 31, at 138–39 (2012); see also S. REP. NO. 109–14, at 23 (2005).
116. No. 99 CV 8238, 2000 WL 1644539, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 27, 2000).
117. See Minute Order of Mar. 20, 2002 at 1, Zapka, 2000 WL 1644539 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 27, 2000) (No. 1:99cv-08238).
118. Oshana v. Coca–Cola Co., 225 F.R.D. 575, 577–78 (N.D. Ill. 2005).
119. Id. at 578–79.
120. Id. at 579.
121. Id.
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The lesson, in fact, is clear: battling class certification just forces a defendant to
keep litigating the question, against plaintiffs who will continue to bring motions or
suits until they manage to win or the defendant capitulates and settles the whole
class.122 Indeed, the court in Worthington v. Bayer Healthcare, LLC dismissed the
case because a California case was first-filed but deliberately gave leave to re-file the
case should the California court deny class certification.123 Effectively, a victory for
Defendant in the California case will just result in the resumption of the New Jersey
case and the same fight.124 The case dismissal in New Jersey acts as more of a timeout than an actual dismissal.125 So established is this try-try again idea, that at least
one named plaintiff argued immediately for re-briefing after discovery if class
certification was denied.126 The court, however, rebuffed this bet-hedging.127
A quintessential illustration of how victory can just bring a defendant more grief
is found in Thorogood v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.128 For instance, Sears, Roebuck &
Company found itself subject to a class action lawsuit brought by a named plaintiff,
Steven Thorogood.129 The court considered the class action suit to be “nearfrivolous.”130 It was based on representations by Sears that its dryer drums were
122. See, e.g., Carrera v. Bayer Corp., No. 08–4716 (JLL), 2011 WL 5878376, at *1 (D.N.J. Nov. 22, 2011);
Badella v. Deniro Mktg. LLC, No. C 10–03908 CRB, 2011 WL 5358400, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 4, 2011) (denying
class certification and simultaneously setting briefing schedule for new class certification motion); Red v. Kraft
Foods, Inc., No. CV 10–1028–GW (AGRx), 2011 WL 4599833, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 29, 2011) (denying class
certification and simultaneously setting briefing schedule for new class certification motion); Kingsbury v. U.S.
Greenfiber, LLC, No. CV 08–00151 AHM (JTLx), 2011 WL 2619231, at *1 (C.D. Cal. May 23, 2011) (regarding
plaintiffs’ fourth motion for class certification); Campion v. Old Republic Home Prot. Co., Inc., No. 09–CV–
748–JMA(NLS), 2011 WL 1935967, at *1 (S.D. Cal. May 20, 2011) (“A motion for reconsideration may not be
used to get a second bite at the apple.”); id. at *6 (“It is unclear as to whether Plaintiff, who states ‘it can
sometimes take plaintiffs two, three, or even four bites at the class-certification apple to propose a class that
meets Rule 23’s requirements’ intends to re-seek certification as to the previously proposed class or to modify
his proposed class definition and then seek certification as to a new proposed class.”); Heisler v. Maxtor Corp.,
No. 5:06–cv–06634–JF (PSG), 2011 WL 1496114, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 20, 2011); Order on Pls.’ Mot. for Class
Certification, In re Light Cigarettes Mktg. Sales Practices Litig., 271 F.R.D. 402, 413 (D. Me. 2010) [hereinafter
“Order”] (listing thirteen prior attempts to certify a class of light cigarette smokers). Some commentators have
noted that the recent Supreme Court decision in Walmart v. Dukes seems to make it harder for plaintiffs to
certify a class. See Erwin Chemerinsky, New Limits on Class Actions, 47 TRIAL 54, 54 (Nov. 2011); Timothy D.
Edwards, Class Action Suits after Walmart v. Dukes, 84 WIS. LAW. 18, 18 (Nov. 2011), available at
http://www.wisbar.org/. However, the Supreme Court’s decision in Smith v. Bayer Corp. seems to counter that
by permitting plaintiffs’ attorneys more opportunities to try to get a class certification to stick. See 131 S. Ct.
2368 (2011).
123. See Nos. 11-2793 (ES), 11-3017 (ES), 11-3299 (ES), 2012 WL 1079716, at *7 n.5, *8 (D.N.J. Mar. 30,
2012).
124. Id. at *7 n.5.
125. Id.
126. See Walewski v. ZeniMax Media, Inc., No. 6:11-cv-1178-Orl-28, 2012 WL 834125, at *3 (M.D. Fla.
Jan. 30, 2012), report and recommendation adopted, 6:11-cv-1178-Orl-28, 2012 WL 847236 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 13,
2012).
127. Id. at *3, *9.
128. 678 F.3d 546 (7th Cir. 2012).
129. Id. at 547.
130. Id.
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stainless steel, which the named plaintiff alleged he understood to mean entirely
stainless steel, when in fact there was a portion of the drum made of ceramic-coated
regular steel that could only be seen “if [the user] craned his head inside the
drum.”131 A class was initially certified, but the Seventh Circuit decertified it based
on a ruling that “there [were] no common issues of law or fact.”132 At first glance,
this may seem like a win to Sears. Not so: another named plaintiff then brought a
copycat suit in California.133 Sears moved to enjoin the suit based on the Seventh
Circuit’s ruling in the first suit, and initially won.134 However, the Seventh Circuit,
based on the Supreme Court’s ruling in Smith v. Bayer Corp., later threw up its
hands and decided that there was nothing it could do to prevent Sears from having
to defend against a number of such copycat suits based on what appeared to be
“near-frivolous” allegations.135 As the Seventh Circuit noted, Sears’s strongest
arguments for why it should be protected from such serial suits were matters of
policy stemming from this common misuse of the class action procedure; there was
no jurisdictional doctrine to protect it.136 As the Seventh Circuit saw it, “the policy
concerns are acute.”137 But the Seventh Circuit found it had no choice but to permit
the copycat suit to go forward.138 In this case, Sears would have been better off not
fighting class certification and either dealing with the merits of the “near-frivolous”
case or just settling to try to get out of the labyrinth.
In addition to the cycle of duplicative cases facing a defendant who does not
settle a class action, it is an ethical violation for plaintiffs’ attorneys to agree, as part
of a settlement, not to pursue further claims against the defendant.139 This means
that failure to certify the class in settlement would result in the possibility of not
just multiple cases involving the same class of plaintiffs but multiple cases involving
the same plaintiffs’ attorneys.140 Nor is there any guarantee that a motion to dismiss
or motion for summary judgment will stand up due to the complicated preclusive
issues of different causes of action in different states.141

131. Id. at 548–49.
132. Id. at 549 (internal quotations omitted) (emphasis in original) (quoting Thorogood v. Sears, Roebuck
& Co., 547 F.3d 742, 747 (7th Cir. 2008)).
133. Id. at 547.
134. Id. at 548.
135. Id. at 547–48 (citing Smith v. Bayer, 131 S. Ct. 2368 (2011)); id. at 552.
136. Id. at 552.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. See McCoy et al., supra note 78, at 40.
140. Thorogood, 678 F.3d at 547 (“Not only was it a copycat suit, but Murray had been a member of
Thorogood's proposed (and certified, but later decertified) class, and was represented in his own suit by counsel
who had represented Thorogood in the latter's class action suit.”).
141. See, e.g., Howard M. Erichson, Interjurisdictional Preclusion, 96 MICH. L. REV. 945, 976–77 (1998).
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Meanwhile, it is in the plaintiffs’ best interest to get the class certified, too.142 The
very nature of deceptive advertising causes of action ensures that it is unlikely all
class members will independently sue.143 The settlement of the whole class is the best
way for most consumers to ever achieve any redress.144 Even plaintiffs’ attorneys
have an incentive to get the class certified and the settlement approved.145 While
serial cases may sound nice in the abstract, one fell swoop of money surely sounds
even nicer. Therefore, even with the challenges of settling a certified class, there
remains unusually strong incentive on both sides to settle — and to settle early,
because costs rise quickly in class actions.
In fact, in order to even reach a wildly unpredictable and dubiously helpful class
certification decision, all parties must engage in lengthy, expensive discovery.146 The
named plaintiffs often must sit for depositions.147 Class members beyond the named
plaintiffs may be deposed, too,148 which requires the identification and location of

142. See, e.g., Heather M. Johnson, Resolution of Mass Product Liability Litigation Within the Federal Rules:
A Case for the Increased Use of Rule 23(b)(3) Class Actions, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 2329, 2333 (1996) (“Rule 23
allows plaintiffs to combine resources and litigate claims or issues together, thereby providing access to the civil
justice system for plaintiffs who lack financial resources to bring individual claims.”).
143. See, e.g., Debra Pogrund Stark & Jessica M. Choplin, Does Fraud Pay? An Empirical Analysis of
Attorney's Fees Provisions in Consumer Fraud Statutes, 56 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 483, 490 (2008) (reasoning that in
cases of consumer fraud, “a consumer is unlikely to bring an individual lawsuit on the basis of the common law
action for fraud to recover her losses because the legal fees and costs for the lawsuit far outweigh the amount the
consumer could recover from the lawsuit”).
144. See id.; see also Leslie, supra note 76, at 1012–13.
145. See Leslie, supra note 76, at 1010, 1012–13.
146. See § 1785.3 Timing of Certification, 7AA FED. PRAC. & PROC. CIV. § 1785.3 (3d ed. 2005) ("[C]ourts
frequently have ruled that discovery relating to the issue whether a class action is appropriate needs to be
undertaken before deciding whether to allow the action to proceed on a class basis.").
147. See, e.g., Guido v. L’Oreal, USA, Inc., Nos. CV 11–1067 CAS (JCx), CV 11-5465 CAS (JCx), 2012 WL
1616912, at *3 (C.D. Cal. May 7, 2012), reconsideration granted, Guido v. L’Oreal, USA, Inc., Nos. CV 11–1067
CAS (JCx), CV 11-5465 CAS (JCx), 2012 WL 2458118 (C.D. Cal. June 25, 2012) (referencing deposition of
named plaintiff); In re Yasmin and Yaz Mktg. Sales Practices and Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 3:09–md–02100–
DRH–PMF, 2012 WL 865041, at *16 (S.D. Ill. Mar. 13, 2012) (reviewing the deposition of Ms. Burns, a named
plaintiff); Carrera v. Bayer Corp., No. 08–4716 (JLL), 2011 WL 5878376, at *3 (D.N.J. Nov. 22, 2011)
(discussing the named plaintiff’s deposition testimony as it relates to the Defendants’ case); Badella v. Deniro
Mktg. LLC, No. C 10–03908 CRB, 2011 WL 5358400, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 4, 2011) (detailing the
circumstances of one named plaintiff’s depature following his deposition); In re Ferrero Litig., 278 F.R.D. 552,
560 (S.D. Cal. 2011) (referring to a named plaintiff’s deposition testimony regarding Nutella); Red v. Kraft
Foods, Inc., No. CV 10–1028–GW (AGRx), 2011 WL 4599833, at *6 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 29, 2011) (recalling exact
language from two named plaintiffs’ testimony about “indulgent treats”); Zeisel v. Diamond Foods, Inc., No. C
10–01192 JSW, 2011 WL 2221113, at *4 (N.D. Cal. June 7, 2011) (using a named plaintiff’s deposition
testimony to determine the plaintiff’s standing); see also Heisler v. Maxtor Corp., No. 5:06–cv–06634–JF (PSG),
2011 WL 1496114, at *4–5 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 20, 2011); Fitzpatrick v. Gen. Mills Inc., 263 F.R.D. 687, 691–92
(S.D. Fla 2010), vacated, Fitzpatrick v. Gen. Mills Inc., 635 F.3d 1279, 1281 (11th Cir. 2011); Nelson v. Mead
Johnson Nutrition Co., 270 F.R.D. 689, 695 (S.D. Fla. 2010); In re Light Cigarettes Mktg. Sales Practices Litig.,
271 F.R.D. 402, 411 (D. Me. 2010); Weiner v. Snapple Beverage Corp., No. 07 Civ. 8742 (DLC), 2010 WL
3119452, at *2 n.3, *8 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 5, 2010); In re Sears, Roebuck & Co. Tools Mktg. and Sales Practices
Litig., Nos. 05 C 4742, 05 C 2623, 2007 WL 4287511, at *7 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 4, 2007).
148. See, e.g., In re Light Cigarettes Mktg. Sales Practices Litig., 271 F.R.D. at 416; Weiner, 2010 WL 3119452,
at *3.
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these class members — an enormous expense in a day and age when the amount of
retained information has exploded.149 Witnesses for the defendant are often deposed
as well.150 The parties frequently engage experts, another sizeable expense.151 Indeed,
in at least one case the court criticized one defendant’s expert for not having
undertaken a survey, implying that not only the use of an expert but the costly
exercise of a full-blown consumer survey may now be de rigeur at the class
certification stage.152
Because attorneys’ fees are approved based in part on percentage of settlement
amount, the defendant has a better chance of keeping the overall settlement low if it
can settle before attorneys’ fees rack up.153 Otherwise, the defendant may be forced
to increase the settlement amount just to justify the increased attorneys’ fees.154
Therefore, even with CAFA’s additional guidance, settlement remains tricky to
navigate in the class action context.

149. See, e.g., In re Ky. Grilled Chicken Coupon Mktg. & Sales Practices Litig., 280 F.R.D. 364, 387 (N.D. Ill.
2011).
150. See In re Am. Med. Sys., Inc., 75 F.3d 1069, 1081 n.13 (6th Cir. 1996); In re Ky. Grilled Chicken, 280
F.R.D. at 372; Weiner, 2010 WL 3119452, at *8.
151. See, e.g., Thorogood v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 678 F.3d 546, 548 (7th Cir. 2012) (relying on the
plaintiff’s engineering expertise); Heisler, 2011 WL 1496114, at *3 (filing expert disclosures); Red, 2011 WL
4599833, at *12 (offering the testimony of a Columbia Business School professor); Wolph v. Acer Am. Corp.,
272 F.R.D. 477, 482 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (using expert testimony to demonstrate the plausibility of their claim);
Zeisel, 2011 WL 2221113, at *2 (submitting an expert report from a medical doctor); Carrera v. Bayer Corp.,
No. 08-4716 (JLL), 2011 WL 5878376, at *3 (D.N.J. Nov. 22, 2011) (using expert testimony of a doctor); Salon
Fad v. L’Oreal USA, Inc., No. 10 Civ. 5063(DLC), 2011 WL 4089902, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 14, 2011)
(supporting their claim with an expert report of an economics professor); Chavez v. Blue Sky Natural Beverage
Co., 268 F.R.D. 365, 377 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (offering expert testimony as to the materiality of Blue Sky’s product
labeling and marketing); Fitzpatrick, 263 F.R.D. at 697 (submitting an expert report that explains the brand
benefit garnered when a product helps digestive issues); In re Light Cigarettes Mktg. Sales Practices Litig., 271
F.R.D. at 408 (introducing expert testimony demonstrating the defendant’s knowledge of the harm of
cigarettes); Weiner, 2010 WL 3119452, at *4, *9–10 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 5, 2010) (offering expert testimony on the
certification of plaintiff’s class).
152. See Weiner, 2010 WL 3119452, at *8 (criticizing Defendant’s expert for not citing any specific studies
or specific market research that would make his reports more reliable). Earlier court decisions appear to have
permitted less costly declarations in lieu of full-blown expert reports. See In re Am. Med. Sys., Inc., 75 F.3d at
1081 n.15 (using a mere statement of a doctor as support for an argument). However, that precedent may now
be passé. See Jenkins v. Hyundai Motor Fin. Co., No. C2-04-720, 2008 WL 781862, *3 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 24,
2008) (refusing to characterize expert testimony as such if it only expresses legal conclusions and not facts).
153. See In re Bluetooth Headset Products Liab. Litig., 654 F.3d 935, 942 (9th Cir. 2011) (awarding
attorneys’ fees based on the lodestar method because a settlement was reached); In re Heartland Payment Sys.,
Inc. Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 851 F. Supp. 2d 1040, 1074–75 (S.D. Tex. 2012) (discussing how
attorneys’ fees are tied to the value of the benefits actually provided to the class, which is largely based on the
amount of hours actually worked); Hartless v. Clorox Co., 273 F.R.D. 630, 645 (S.D. Cal. 2011) (finding
attorneys’ fees reasonable based on achieving a favorable result and the expertise required to successfully try the
case); In re Ky. Grilled Chicken, 280 F.R.D. at 379–80 (reimbursing attorneys from the settlement fund). CAFA
also explicitly links attorneys’ fees in coupon settlements to the value of the coupons redeemed. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 1712 (2006) (“[T]he portion of any attorney’s fee award to class counsel that is attributable to the award of
the coupons shall be based on the value to class members of the coupons that are redeemed.”).
154. See In re Bluetooth, 654 F.3d at 945 (finding an issue with the attorneys receiving 83.2% of the class’
total award and ultimately rejecting the proposed settlement by remanding it back to the District Court).
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B. Inconsistent Precedent
A wealth of inconsistent precedent, not entirely attributable to warring state statutes
but certainly not helped by them,155 ensures that it is impossible to establish
uniform guidance for national advertising campaigns — or the class action
litigations that result. A brief comparison of different cases’ treatment of reliance on
the allegedly deceptive statements illustrates this.
In Fine v. ConAgra Foods, Inc., Plaintiffs sought to certify a class of consumers
who had purchased popcorn marked “no added diacetyl,” yet still containing some
diacetyl.156 Under California law, the court denied certification, stating that there
was no indication that the class had relied on the statement in question.157 Chavez v.
Blue Sky Natural Beverage Co., likewise brought under California statutes, also
concerned an allegedly untrue statement on a product: this time, the statement that
the product originated from Santa Fe when the beverages in question were not
made in Santa Fe.158 In this case, however, the court granted certification.159 While
the Defendant raised the issue that had prevented class certification in Fine —
namely, that it was impossible to know if each consumer in the class had relied on
the statement in question in purchasing the product — the court dismissed the
concern as irrelevant.160 Indeed, the court in Kelly v. Phiten USA, Inc. seemed to
agree with Chavez, certifying a class for settlement purposes under California and
Iowa law while acknowledging that “some significant number of purchasers”
bought the product “without regard to” the alleged deceptive statements.161 In Red
v. Kraft Foods, Inc., however, also under California law, the court refused to certify a
class that, inter alia, it found to be unascertainable, even though the class definition
was remarkably similar to that of classes that had been certified in other deceptive
advertising cases,162 because it would be impossible to determine which consumers

155. See Gianino v. Alacer Corp., 846 F. Supp. 2d 1096, 1100 (C.D. Cal. 2012) (detailing differences
between state laws).
156. No. CV 10-01848 SJO (CFOx), 2010 WL 3632469, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 26, 2010).
157. Id. at *3.
158. 268 F.R.D. 365, 368–69 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (contending that Blue Sky’s beverages were not
manufactured or bottled in Sante Fe or anywhere in the state of New Mexico).
159. Id. at 368.
160. Id. at 376 (holding that plaintiff does not need to show individualized reliance in order to allege claims
of CLRA or fraud).
161. Kelly v. Phiten USA, Inc., 277 F.R.D. 564, 570 n.7 (S.D. Iowa 2011).
162. See Johns v. Bayer Corp., 280 F.R.D. 551, 555 (S.D. Cal. 2012) (certifying a class of all persons who
purchased Men’s Vitamins in the state of California from the date that they were first sold with “prostate
health” claims); In re Ferrero Litig., 278 F.R.D. 552, 562 (S.D. Cal. 2011) (certifying a class of all persons who,
on or after August 1, 2009, bought a Nutella product in the state of California for their own or household use);
Red v. Kraft Foods, Inc., No. CV 10-1028-GW (AGRx), 2011 WL 4599833, at *8 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 29, 2011)
(refusing to certify the class because its members were unascertainable); Kelly, 277 F.R.D. at 567–69 (granting
certification of a class of all persons who purchased one or more of Phiten products in the U.S. during the
relevant period); Chavez, 268 F.R.D. at 380 (certifying a class of all persons who, during the relevant period,
purchased in the U.S. any beverage bearing the Blue Sky mark or brand); Nelson v. Mead Johnson Nutrition
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had purchased the product at issue in reliance on the allegedly deceptive
statements.163 This is not even a result of different state statutory requirements: all of
these cases were applying California law.
Likewise, courts have reached wildly different conclusions about the importance
of whether consumers continued to buy the product at issue, even after the alleged
deception was revealed. In Nelson v. Mead Johnson Nutrition Co., the named
plaintiff testified at deposition that she continued using the product at issue, even
after learning the truth about the product.164 In In re Light Cigarettes Marketing Sales
Practices Litigation the named plaintiff testified at deposition that he continued
using the product at issue, even after learning the truth about the product.165 The
court in Nelson granted class certification under Florida law;166 the court in Light
Cigarettes denied it under California, District of Columbia, Illinois, and Maine
law.167 There were undeniable differences between the two cases, and neither
decision pivoted exclusively on whether or not the named plaintiff had continued
to use the allegedly deceiving product.168 However, both courts pointed to that fact
as supporting completely opposite conclusions.169 Faced with seemingly inconsistent
plaintiff testimony, a defendant may not know whether that testimony will be
helpful or not to the defense. Indeed, the court in In re Ferrero Litigation viewed the
knowledge that one of the named plaintiffs continued to purchase the product —
even after learning the truth about it — as having no bearing on the class
certification analysis.170 Increasing the confusion, other courts have stated that
Co., 270 F.R.D. 689, 691 (S.D. Fla. 2010) (certifying a class of all Florida consumers who purchased Enfamil
LIPIL within the applicable statute of limitations).
163. See Red, 2011 WL 4599833, at *8; see also Oshana v. Coca–Cola Co., 225 F.R.D. 575, 581, 583 (N.D. Ill.
2005) (denying class certification because class membership would require consumers “to show they were
misled, deceived, tricked, or treated unfairly,” although reliance was not required under the Illinois Consumer
Fraud Act).
164. Nelson, 270 F.R.D. at 695.
165. See In re Light Cigarettes Mktg. Sales Practices Litig., 271 F.R.D. 402, 412 (D. Me. 2010) (noting that
plaintiffs continued to purchase cigarettes after learning of the alleged fraud).
166. Nelson, 270 F.R.D. at 698.
167. In re Light Cigarettes Mktg. Sales Practices Litig., 271 F.R.D. at 423.
168. See id. at 416–17, 422 (holding that issues of predominance and superiority prevented class
certification); Nelson, 270 F.R.D. at 695 (continuing to discuss other class certification factors in spite of
evidence showing that plaintiff continued to use the defendant’s product after learning it was defective).
169. See Nelson, 270 F.R.D. at 695–96 (finding it unpersuasive that the plaintiff continued to purchase the
defendant’s product, even after learning of its alleged defects); In re Light Cigarettes Mktg. Sales Practices Litig.,
271 F.R.D. at 421 (finding the issue of continuing to purchase the alleged defective product to weigh against
issues of commonality, but enough to alone bar class certification); see also Red v. Kraft Foods, Inc., No. CV 101028-GW (AGRx), 2011 WL 4599833, at *12 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 29, 2011) (finding the issue of continuing to
purchase the alleged defective item to destroy plaintiff’s ability to establish reliance or materiality of the alleged
misrepresentations).
170. See In re Ferrero Litig., 278 F.R.D. 552, 560 (S.D. Cal. 2011) (noting that plaintiff’s continued
purchases of the defendant’s product after learning of the alleged defect did not impact issues of class
commonality). But see Guido v. L’Oreal, USA, Inc., Nos. CV 11-1067 CAS (JCx), CV 11-5465 CAS (JCx), 2012
WL 1616912, at *7 (C.D. Cal. May 7, 2012) (finding it noteworthy that all of the named plaintiffs had testified
that they would not have bought the product without the allegedly misleading statements).
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whether or not the plaintiff continued to purchase the product after learning the
truth about the product has nothing to do with class certification, but rather with
the strength of the case, and is inappropriate to examine at the class certification
stage.171
Finally, some of the language in the cases is so broad as to appear to preclude
class actions for deceptive advertising under any circumstances. In Salon Fad v.
L’Oreal USA, Inc., the deceptive advertising at issue was variations of the phrase
“Sold in Salons Only” found on hair care product bottles.172 The court remarked:
[I]t is difficult to imagine how there could be class-wide proof of causation
and injury. How salon customers would react to learning that a product
which was advertised as exclusively sold in salons was also available in
another retail environment is inherently an individualized question. To
some consumers, it may be of little significance that the product is also
available outside of the salon, unless of course it could be acquired more
cheaply in a general retail establishment.173
The same could be said of any piece of allegedly deceptive advertising: some
consumers might not care at all about it. For example, surely some consumers
buying the beverage at issue in Chavez did not care if the beverage was
manufactured in New Mexico or not.174
Frankly, regardless of the differences between state statutes, it appears to be the
case that courts are inevitably influenced by their opinion of the underlying merits
of the case in their decisions whether to certify a class, which makes practical class
certification precedent hard to come by. Where a court is skeptical about the
underlying merits, that court finds issues in facts and details that another court,
persuaded by the underlying merits, finds to be irrelevant.175 For instance, the court
in Walewski v. Zenimax Media, Inc., commenced its analysis of the Plaintiffs’ class
certification motion with a harsh critique of Plaintiffs’ tactics in bringing the
motion.176 The court then went on to raise scathing issues with the class Plaintiffs
sought to certify.177 For instance, the court made much of the fact that, as defined,
not every member of the class would necessarily have complaints about the
171. See Oshana v. Coca–Cola Co., 225 F.R.D. 575, 575, 583 (N.D. Ill. 2005) (finding that plaintiff’s
continued purchases of the defendant’s product after learning of the alleged defect is an aspect of case’s merits
and is not decided during class certification analysis).
172. Salon Fad v. L’Oreal USA, Inc., No. 10 Civ. 5063(DLC), 2011 WL 4089902, at *1–2 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 14,
2011).
173. Id. at *7.
174. Chavez v. Blue Sky Natural Beverage Co., 268 F.R.D. 365, 378 (N.D. Cal. 2010).
175. See infra notes 176–84 and accompanying text.
176. No. 6:11-cv-1178-Orl-28DAB, 2012 WL 834125, at *3 (M.D. Fla. Jan 30, 2012) (recommending that
plaintiff’s motion for class certification be denied because it was filed in an untimely manner).
177. Id. at *3–4.
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product.178 However, other courts have been unconcerned with the prospect that
class members might not have complaints about the product (and, indeed, might
still be purchasing the product).179 The Walewski court also fretted over the inability
to identify all members of the class.180 Meanwhile, other courts faced with a similar
issue were unconcerned.181 For instance, the court in Johns v. Bayer Corp., faced with
the challenge of certifying a class of purchasers of multivitamins, never even
discussed the difficulties of identifying who these purchasers might be.182 Needless
to say, the court did not certify the class in Walewski.183 While such influence by the
merits of the underlying case is not technically permitted,184 it nonetheless seems to
occur.
C. Statewide Classes
The inability to certify a nationwide class to address issues of national significance
can have far-reaching consequences, subjecting the courts to duplicative litigations
and the parties to multiple copycat disagreements, as CAFA recognizes.185 This
certification failure not only makes final court resolution of the issues nonexistent,
but it also stalls settlements, as a defendant may only wish to settle a class action if
that defendant can settle the entire nationwide issue.186 However, certifying a
nationwide class for the state law governed field of deceptive advertising is tricky:
Where the applicable law in a case derives from the law of numerous states,
as opposed to just one state, differences in state law will compound the
disparities among class members from different states. . . . Certifying a class
178. Id. at *4–5 (finding issues with plaintiff’s class definition because it would include members who did
not have any complaints about defendant’s game).
179. See In re Ferrero Litig., 278 F.R.D. 552, 560 (S.D. Cal. 2011) (dismissing the issue of whether or not
potential class members had concerns with defendant’s product).
180. See Walewski, 2012 WL 834125, at *4 (finding plaintiff’s class definition “fraught with difficulties”
because of the issues in identifying the class members); see also In re Light Cigarettes Mktg. Sales Practices Litig.,
271 F.R.D. 402, 422 (D. Me. 2010) (noting the concern in finding all purchasers of defendant’s cigarettes);
Weiner v. Snapple Beverage Corp., No. 07 Civ. 8742 (DLC), 2010 WL 3119452, at *13 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 5, 2010).
181. See In re Ferrero, 278 F.R.D. at 562 (certifying a class of purchasers of Nutella®); Chavez v. Blue Sky
Natural Beverage Co., 268 F.R.D. 365, 378 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (finding that a class of all purchasers of an
inexpensive beverage would be identifiable).
182. 280 F.R.D. 551, 556 (S.D. Cal. 2012). But see Thompson v. Bayer Corp., No. 4:07CV00017 JMM, 2009
WL 2424352, at *3 (E.D. Ark. Aug. 6, 2009) (expressing doubt that a class of purchasers of multivitamins could
ever be ascertainable).
183. Walewski, 2012 WL 834125, at *1.
184. See Loeb Indus., Inc. v. Sumitomo Corp., 306 F.3d 469, 480 (7th Cir. 2002) (“A court may not refuse
to certify a class on the ground that it thinks the class will eventually lose on the merits . . . .”).
185. See, e.g., S. REP. NO. 109–14, at 27 (2005) (“These provisions will create efficiencies in the judicial
system by enabling overlapping and ‘copycat’ cases to be consolidated in a single federal court, rather than
proceeding simultaneously in numerous state courts under the current system.”).
186. See Staton v. Boeing Co., 327 F.3d 938, 964 (9th Cir. 2003) (“[A] defendant is interested only in
disposing of the total claim asserted against it.”).
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when the laws of every state apply can create insuperable obstacles in
adjudicating the case in a fair and efficient manner.187
While resolving all the alleged injury in one fell swoop is clearly most efficient for
all involved, the state law nature of deceptive advertising thwarts that efficiency:
“Variations in state law can swamp any common issues and interject a multitude of
different legal standards governing a particular claim. The presentation of evidence
at trial, jury instructions, and verdict forms become cumbersome, time-consuming,
confusing, and unduly prejudicial to the parties.”188
For instance, in a case involving allegedly deceptive statements on the boxes of
several different products sold nationwide, a California federal court declined to
certify a national class.189 The court, however, stated that, if there had not been other
problems with the case, it might have certified a smaller California-only case —
even though, again, the allegedly deceptive statements at issue were part of a
nationwide campaign.190 Similarly, despite the nationwide character of the allegedly
deceptive statements at issue, a California court refused to certify a nationwide class
while agreeing to certify a California-only class.191 As one court stated:
If this case proceeded to trial as a nationwide class, the Court would face the
impossible task of instructing the jury on the law of 50 different states. . . .
The trial would devolve quickly into an unmanageable morass of divergent
legal issues. Certain evidence would be admissible for some class members
but not others. Fifty different sets of jury instructions and verdict forms
would have to be crafted with the jury having the daunting task of applying
those instructions and verdicts to a nationwide class encompassing millions
of consumers. Needless to say, the trial would be incredibly timeconsuming, unnecessarily disjointed, hopelessly confusing, and unfairly
prejudicial to [Defendant] and many, if not all, of the members of the class.

187. Gianino v. Alacer Corp., 846 F. Supp. 2d 1096, 1099 (C.D. Cal. 2012) (internal quotations and
citations omitted).
188. Id.
189. See Red v. Kraft Foods, Inc., No. CV 10-1028-GW (AGRx), 2011 WL 4599833, at *7 (C.D. Cal. Sept.
29, 2011) (denying class certification for, inter alia, concerns that defendant’s misrepresentations actually
originated in California).
190. Id. (noting that there were several other issues with the class that precluded certification).
191. See In re Ferrero Litig., 278 F.R.D. 552, 561 (S.D. Cal. 2011); see also Carrera v. Bayer Corp., No. 084716 (JLL), 2011 WL 5878376, at *1 (D.N.J. Nov. 22, 2011). But see Bruno v. Eckhart Corp., 280 F.R.D. 540, 549
(C.D. Cal. 2012) (finding defendant did not carry its burden of proving material conflict between California’s
consumer protection laws and the rest of the nation’s consumer protection laws).
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Justice demands that this case not be adjudicated as a nationwide class
action.192
Multiple lawsuits over the same deceptive statements often inevitably crop up in
this situation.193 In fact, so prevalent are multiple litigations in the class action
context that some courts have refused to certify a class without the presence of
duplicative litigation.194 Many times, these multiple lawsuits actually proceed.195
Indeed, if a court does dismiss duplicative litigation, it must minimize differences in
the state statutes to do so.196 These court actions do not promote judicial efficiency
in any way.197 Courts often find themselves litigating cases that other courts are
simultaneously litigating, with the risk of inconsistent results.198 For instance, a New
Jersey court refused to allow the Plaintiff of a first-filed California suit based on the
same allegedly deceptive advertisements to intervene, stating there was no risk of
inconsistent rulings because different statutes were at issue.199 However, a few
192. Gianino, 846 F. Supp. 2d at 1104 (internal citations omitted); see also In re Sears, Roebuck & Co. Tools
Mktg. and Sales Practices Litig., Nos. 05 C 4742, 05 C 2623, 2007 WL 4287511, at *10 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 4, 2007)
(“[P]laintiff’s essentially conclusory assertions that the . . . consumer fraud laws are ‘very similar’ are wholly
unpersuasive. The differences in the . . . consumer fraud laws of the states are another factor that renders the
proposed class action unmanageable.”).
193. See Andreeva, supra note 43, at 394 (“[T]he filing of a single class action in a state court often leads to
a number of ‘copycat’ cases being filed in other jurisdictions.”) (citing 151 CONG. REC. S1248–49 (2005)
(statement of Sen. Frist)); see also In re Bluetooth Headset Products Liab. Litig., 654 F.3d 935, 938 (9th Cir.
2011) (noting that twenty-six class actions had been filed); Morgan v. Gay, 471 F.3d 469, 471 (3d Cir. 2006)
(noting that the case had originally been filed in federal court in New York, then consolidated with a previously
filed related case in federal court in Utah, then dismissed and brought again in state court in New Jersey);
Guido v. L’Oreal, USA, Inc., Nos. CV 11-1067 CAS (JCx), CV 11-5465 CAS (JCx), 2012 WL 1616912, at *1
(C.D. Cal. May 7, 2012) (cases filed in the Central District of California and the Southern District of New York
within a day of each other); Worthington v. Bayer Healthcare, LLC, Nos. 11-2793 (ES), 11-3017(ES), 113299(ES), 2012 WL 1079716, at *1 (D.N.J. Mar. 30, 2012) (dismissed in favor of first-filed California case); In re
Heartland Payment Sys., Inc. Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 851 F. Supp. 2d 1040, 1047 (S.D. Tex. 2012);
Hartless v. Clorox Co., 273 F.R.D. 630, 636 (S.D. Cal. 2011) (with its related cases: Case No. 37-2009-93810CU-BT-CTL in San Diego Superior Court and Case No. 09cv138 in S.D. Cal.); Walter v. Hughes Commc’ns,
Inc., No. 09-2136 SC, 2011 WL 2650711, at *2 (N.D. Cal. July 6, 2011); In re Ky. Grilled Chicken Coupon Mktg.
& Sales Practices Litig., 280 F.R.D. 371, 371 (N.D. Ill. 2011).
194. See Badella v. Deniro Mktg. LLC, No. C 10-03908 CRB, 2011 WL 5358400, at *12 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 4,
2011) (noting that the absence of other litigation concerning the same issue weighed against class certification).
195. See Weiner v. Snapple Beverage Corp., No. 07 Civ. 8742 (DLC), 2010 WL 3119452, at *3 (S.D.N.Y.
Aug. 5, 2010) (proceeding simultaneously with “a nearly identical action” in federal court in another state).
196. See Worthington, 2012 WL 1079716, at *6 (finding substantial overlap between cases filed against the
defendant, even when they were filed under different state statutes).
197. Indeed, it goes against one of the purposes of class actions. See MCLAUGHLIN, supra note 32, §§ 1:1,
1:3; FED. R. CIV. P. 23 1966 Amendment Clause (A) (“Actions by or against a class provide a ready and fair
means of achieving unitary adjudication.”).
198. See MCLAUGHLIN, supra note 32, § 1:1 (“Finally, the class action avoids inconsistent results by offering
the efficiency and predictability of a unitary adjudication or settlement of the claims of all persons to whom the
defendant may be liable based on similar facts.”); Weiner, 2010 WL 3119452, at *3 (proceeding simultaneously
with “a nearly identical action” in federal court in another state).
199. Worthington v. Bayer Healthcare, LLC, Nos. 11-2793 (ES)(CLW), 11-3017 (ES)(CLW), 11-3299
(ES)(CLW), 2011 WL 6303999, at *3 (D.N.J. Dec. 15, 2011); see also Mazza v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 666 F.3d
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months later, the court acknowledged that these different statutes were, in fact,
similar enough that the second-filed case should be dismissed.200
The dissent in Mazza v. American Honda Motor Company, Inc.201 recognizes the
practical disaster this jurisdictional splintering creates:
The majority’s holding will prove devastating to consumers. Individual
claimants will not bring actions to recover the $4,000 paid for the CMBS
systems. Even if consumers did pursue these claims, and even if these claims
proved successful, they “would not only unnecessarily burden the judiciary,
but would prove uneconomic for potential plaintiffs’ because ‘litigation costs
would dwarf potential recovery.” Hanlon v. Chrysler Corp., 150 F.3d 1011,
1023 (9th Cir. 1998). Without certification of a nationwide class to which
California law applies, Honda becomes free to avail itself of the benefits
offered by California without having to answer to allegations by consumers
nationwide that it has violated the consumer protection laws of its forum
state. This situation will allow corporations to take advantage of a forum
state’s hospitable business climate on the one hand, while simultaneously
discounting the potential for litigation by nationwide consumers in response
to a particular profit-motivated but harmful action on the other. If the
harm to individual consumers is small enough to create a disincentive to
individual litigation, and if a nationwide class action is not a potential
consequence, corporations can choose increased revenues over the consumer
with impunity. Thus, corporations like Honda will be able to act without
accountability for past behavior and without a check on future profit202
motivated actions that may risk consumer harm.
Moreover, the tangle of precedent for a deceptive advertising class action has
become so convoluted that at least one court found it necessary to resort to giving a
lesson on persuasive versus binding authority.203 This confusing federalist tangle
stands in contrast to the goal of CAFA to try to eliminate such complication and
draw a halt to the abuses of federalism in states applying other states’ laws (or not
581, 590, 591 (9th Cir. 2012) (decertifying a nationwide class because of differences in consumer protection
laws); In re Ferrero Litig., No. 11-CV-00205-H (CAB), 2012 WL 284265, at *1 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 23, 2012); Weiner,
2010 WL 3119452, at *3 (proceeding simultaneously with “a nearly identical action” in federal court in another
state).
200. Worthington, 2012 WL 1079716, at *6.
201. 666 F.3d 581 (9th Cir. 2012).
202. Id. at 598–99 (Nelson, J., dissenting).
203. See, e.g., In re Yasmin & Yaz Mktg., Sales Practices & Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 3:09-md-02100-DRHPMF, 2012 WL 865041 at *8 (S.D. Ill. Mar. 13, 2012) (warning that persuasive authority should not be
presented as controlling authority); see also Walewski v. ZeniMax Media, Inc., No. 6:11-cv-1178-Orl-28DAB,
2012 WL 834125 at *5 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 30, 2012), report and recommendation adopted, 6:11-cv-1178-Orl-28DAB,
2012 WL 847236 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 13, 2012) (construing the Maryland Consumer Protection Act by a Florida
court).
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applying other states’ laws).204 The situation becomes unwinnable: Certifying only a
state class provokes precedential confusion and inefficiency; certifying a nationwide
class forces a court to insult federalism.
D. The Frailty of CAFA’s Jurisdictional Provisions
CAFA’s expanded federal jurisdiction was supposed to keep cases of national
importance out of state courts.205 However, the expanded provisions have limited
utility when it comes to deceptive advertising class actions.206 Plaintiffs’ attorneys
can simply certify that recovery will be limited to below the triggering jurisdictional
amount of CAFA.207 This is an easy assertion to make in a situation where only a
statewide class is at issue, despite the nationwide character of the harm.208 In this
way, plaintiffs’ attorneys certify to limit recovery of a group of plaintiffs who, at this
point, do not even know they are part of a class.209 In doing so, the plaintiffs’

204. See Mazza, 666 F.3d at 593 (“The importance of federalism when applying choice of law principles to
class action certification is reinforced by the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005. Pub. L. 109–2, 119 Stat. 4. A key
purpose of the Act was to correct what former Acting Solicitor General Walter Dellinger labeled a wave of ‘false
federalism.’ ‘[T]he problem is that many state courts faced with interstate class actions have undertaken to
dictate the substantive laws of other states by applying their own laws to other states, resulting in a breach of
federalism principles.’ S. REP. NO. 109–14, at 61 (2005), reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 57 (quotation marks
and ellipses omitted). Accordingly, ‘courts should not attempt to apply the laws of one state to behaviors that
occurred in other jurisdictions.’ Id. at 62–63 (summarizing Supreme Court cases).”).
205. See Andreeva, supra note 43, at 388 (quoting the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109–2,
§ 2(b)(2), 119 Stat. 4 (“The Act also aims to ‘restore the intent of the framers of the United States Constitution
by providing the Federal court consideration of interstate cases of national importance.”)); Milliken, supra note
1, at 19.
206. See Sheila Scheuerman, The Consumer Fraud Class Action: Reining in Abuse by Requiring Plaintiffs to
Allege Reliance as an Essential Element, 43 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 1, 33–34 (2006) (“As others have noted, the Class
Action Fairness Act of 2005 (CAFA) is not going to solve the documented abuses of the consumer class
action.”).
207. See, e.g., Rolwing v. Nestle Holdings, Inc., 666 F.3d 1069, 1071 (8th Cir. 2012) (“To counter any
attempt at removal, however, Rolwing's complaint included a prayer for relief requesting ‘judgment against
defendant in an amount that is fair and reasonable in excess of $25,000, but not to exceed $4,999,999.’ The
prayer stated further: ‘Plaintiff and the class do not seek—and will not accept—any recovery of damages (in the
form of statutory interest) and any other relief, in total, in excess of $4,999,999.’”); Tate v. U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n,
No. 06-1204-HU, 2007 WL 1170608 at *2 (D. Or. Apr. 17, 2007) (“[A] plaintiff may evade federal court simply
by asking for less than the jurisdictional amount, so long as the plaintiff, should she prevail, isn't legally certain
to recover more.”) (citation omitted).
208. See, e.g., Yeroushalmi v. Blockbuster Inc., No. CV 05-225-AHM (RCX), 2005 WL 2083008 at *2 (C.D.
Cal. July 11, 2005) (“In the complaint plaintiff alleges that she seeks, on her own behalf and on behalf of the
proposed statewide class, an amount in controversy below CAFA's $5,000,000 jurisdictional threshold.
Specifically, plaintiff alleges that ‘[a]ggregate damages for the named plaintiff and the class she seeks to act as a
representative total less than $5,000,000.’ Compl. ¶ 61.”) (emphasis added).
209. See Alison Frankel, 2nd Circuit: Class Members Deserve Notice, Even in No-Money Deals, THOMAS
REUTERS NEWS & INSIGHT: NEW YORK, Aug. 25, 2012, available at http://newsandinsight.thomsonreuters.com
/Legal/News/2012/08_-_August/2nd_Circuit__Class_members_deserve_notice,_even_in_no-money_deals/
(discussing how some class members are not even given notice of the nationwide claims of which they are
members).
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attorneys fight against the interest of the class from the very beginning.210 An
unknowledgeable named plaintiff has been considered a due process violation of
the absent class members.211 Why shouldn’t a limitation of the absent class
members’ rights be equally considered such a violation? It is certainly more
obviously harmful than an unknowledgeable named plaintiff. In Sanchez v. WalMart Stores, Inc., the court expressed concern that Plaintiff had chosen not to bring
any personal injury claims, engaging in “strategic claim-splitting.”212 The court
found that this “create[d] a conflict between plaintiff’s interests and those of the
putative class, and render[ed] Plaintiff an inadequate class representative.”213 Why
doesn’t the express limitation of recovery of the absent plaintiffs raise the same
concern as limiting their claims?
Courts, however, seem to disagree. For instance, in Morgan v. Gay, a class of
New Jersey consumers asserted that it would not recover more than the $5 million
necessary to trigger federal jurisdiction.214 Morgan concerned a case that had
previously been in no fewer than two federal courts, before being dismissed by class
counsel and re-brought in state court.215 Despite its prior federal jurisdiction and
the fact that the class was seeking punitive damages which could have exceeded $5
million, the court held that class counsel’s promise not to seek more than $5 million
kept the case in state court.216 The vast majority of class members had no say in this
refusal of punitive damages.217 The court dismissed these concerns:
We note in passing that the defendants’ assertion that Sarah Morgan does
not have the ability to limit damages of unnamed class members has no
merit. The availability of opting out by unnamed class members assuages
any concerns that Sarah Morgan’s damage limitation harms these other
class members. The potential class members in this case will be notified
pursuant to New Jersey Court Rules 4:32-1(b)(3) and 4:32-2(b)(2).
Under N.J. Ct. R. 4:32-2(b)(2)(E), “the court will exclude from the class

210. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(g)(1)(B) (requiring plaintiffs’ counsel to act in the best interest of the class, not
merely named clients).
211. See Sanchez v. Wal Mart Stores, Inc., No. Civ. 2:06-CV-02573-JAM-KJM, 2009 WL 1514435, at *3
(E.D. Cal. May 28, 2009) (“Class counsel may not act ‘on behalf of an essentially unknowledgeable client,’ for to
proceed with that plaintiff as class representative ‘would risk a denial of due process to the absent class
members.’”).
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. 471 F.3d 469, 475 (3d Cir. 2006).
215. Id. at 471.
216. Id. at 470–71.
217. Id. at 477–78 (“The plaintiff has made her choice, and the plaintiffs in state court who choose not to
opt out of the class must live with it.”).
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any member who requests exclusion, stating when and how members may
elect to be excluded.”218
In so doing, the court thereby implicitly endorses that the solution to a potentially
artificial limitation on recovery on an admittedly nationwide advertising campaign
will be to subject the defendant to multiple duplicative lawsuits on the question,
even possibly within the same state.219 The court does acknowledge that a verdict far
in excess of the jurisdictional limit may expose class counsel to accusations of bad
faith.220 However, that presupposes that the case will survive to the verdict stage
rather than simply settling.
Likewise, the court in Berry v. American Express Publishing Corp. reaches the
same conclusion.221 There, the Plaintiff class sought mainly injunctive relief and no
monetary damages.222 The class had also specifically stated that it would not seek
more than $5 million in statutory damages.223 The court therefore concluded that it
would be difficult for Plaintiffs to recover more than $5 million in light of these
circumstances, finding that the jurisdictional minimum was not met.224 This ruling,
however, ignores the practicality of class members not yet even aware of the class
who might disagree with being bound to restrict their recovery and might therefore
either object or launch different suits, in California or other states, creating a drag
on judicial efficiency and forcing the defendants to litigate the same question
multiple times. Furthermore, the Defendant in the case tried to demonstrate that
any injunctive relief awarded would cost it more than $5 million to comply with,
which seems likely given the nationwide scope of the practice at issue.225 However,
the court disagreed, finding the Defendant’s valuation of this harm speculative at
best.226 If Defendants are unable to assert the true nationwide impact of any
injunction that may issue in assessing the jurisdictional amount, then the true
national importance of the case cannot be asserted.227

218. Id. at 476 n.7.
219. See also Brill v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 427 F.3d 446, 450 (7th Cir. 2005) (suggesting that
federal jurisdiction could have been avoided if the class had promised not to accept damages in excess of the
jurisdictional minimum).
220. Morgan, 471 F.3d at 477 n.8.
221. Berry v. Am. Express Publ’g, Corp., 381 F. Supp. 2d 1118, 1123–26 (C.D. Cal. 2005) (finding that the
plaintiffs failed to prove that the amount in controversy exceeded the $5 million minimum).
222. Id. at 1123–24.
223. Id. at 1124.
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. See Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 129 S. Ct. 365, 376–77 (2008) (emphasizing the broader
impact of an injunction as “an extraordinary remedy never awarded as of right . . . In exercising their sound
discretion, courts of equity should pay particular regard for the public consequences in employing the
extraordinary remedy of injunction”) (citations omitted).
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Another court in the same jurisdiction went in the opposite direction,
however.228 There, the complaint stated that the class was seeking less than the $5
million jurisdictional minimum.229 The court found this “a clear attempt to avoid
federal jurisdiction.”230 The Plaintiff attempted to argue that she was “entitled to
limit her claim for relief and avoid federal jurisdiction.”231 The court disagreed,
however, finding that the very purpose of CAFA was to eliminate “misuse” of this
nature.232 Such battles remain ongoing.233

V. Fixing the Broken System
CAFA was meant to react to the perception that cases of national significance were
getting stuck in state court.234 However, the nature of deceptive advertising actions
limits CAFA’s impact. It remains a simple matter to keep cases involving
nationwide harm as creatures of state law.235 This curious situation, as has been
shown, promotes efficiency for neither plaintiffs, defendants, nor the courts. The
class action, supposedly a win-win-win for all involved, is far from being so in the
deceptive advertising realm.
Deceptive advertising has become a classic cause of action to be vindicated by
class action procedure.236 The harm to each individual buyer of an inexpensive lowrisk item, such as yogurt, is so small as to be negligible.237 In this age of expensive,
drawn-out litigations, no plaintiff is willing to bring a cause of action to recover the
228. See Yeroushalmi v. Blockbuster Inc., No. CV 05-225-AHM (RCX), 2005 WL 2083008 at *3 (C.D. Cal.
July 11, 2005) (ruling that, in cases where the court is unsure if the amount in controversy exceeds $5 million,
Congress intended CAFA to give jurisdiction to the federal courts).
229. Id. at *2.
230. Id. at *1.
231. Id. at *2.
232. Id. (citing S. REP. NO. 109–14, at 11 (2005)).
233. See Shapiro, supra note 1, at 116 (“One question that the courts have not yet clearly answered is
whether or not plaintiffs could limit the amount in controversy by stipulating that they would not accept any
more than five million dollars in total recovery for the class.”).
234. S. REP. NO. 109–14, at 27 (2005) (“[F]ederal courts are the appropriate forum to decide most
interstate class actions because these cases usually involve large amounts of money and many plaintiffs, and
have significant implications for interstate commerce and national policy . . . .”).
235. Furthermore, the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes may encourage
more state class actions, exacerbating this problem. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, No. 10-277 U.S. 1, slip op.
at 10, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011); see Apalla U. Chopra & David Lowe, Class Action Litigation and Arbitration After
Wal-Mart v. Dukes and AT&T v. Concepcion, 870 PLI/LIT 175, 194 (Nov. 2011).
236. See Guido v. L’Oreal, USA, Inc., Nos. CV 11–1067 CAS (JCx), CV 11–5465 CAS (JCx), 2012 WL
1616912, at *12 (C.D. Cal. May 7, 2012) (finding that class action litigation is superior to other methods of
litigation for deceptive advertising cases); Ballard v. Equifax Check Servs., Inc., 186 F.R.D. 589, 600 (E.D. Cal.
1999) (“[Class actions] to enforce compliance with consumer protection laws are ‘desirable and should be
encouraged.’” (quoting Duran v. Credit Bureau of Yuma, Inc., 93 F.R.D. 607, 610 (D. Ariz. 1982))); see also
CAL. CIV. CODE § 1781 (stating that consumers can bring a class action lawsuit if an “unlawful method, act, or
practice has caused damage to other consumers similarly situated”).
237. See Fitzpatrick v. Gen. Mills, Inc., 263 F.R.D. 687, 702 (S.D. Fla. 2010), vacated, 635 F.3d 1279 (11th
Cir. 2011) (“[E]ach class member has a negligible financial interest in the litigation.”).
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eighty-nine cents they spent on yogurt. Indeed, “incentive payouts” of several
thousand dollars are common to reward plaintiffs who allow themselves to be
named in such class actions, under the accepted belief that otherwise they would
not bother to bring the cause of action.238 Such payouts are not without controversy,
like all else in the class action realm. Other commentators have raised the issue
whether litigation should be permitted at all under circumstances where no single
person actually cares enough to bring the litigation without first receiving an
incentive payout entirely unrelated to the harm suffered by that person.239 At least
one court has expressed skepticism at the contradiction between the named
plaintiffs claiming that recovery at trial would be small enough to discourage
individual actions while simultaneously alleging a justified recovery of thousands of
dollars on their behalf.240 Nevertheless, in recent years, there has been an explosion
of such causes of action.241
Given the popularity of these class actions and the nationwide character of the
harm, it makes sense that such class actions should at least be in federal court.
Making deceptive advertising automatically a federal cause of action, in which the
federal courts preempt the states’ ability to recognize it, may be one option to
improve the system. Currently, the Lanham Act is limited only to competitors,
which keeps these deceptive advertising actions out of the federal courts where they
should probably belong.242 This was originally done to protect federal courts from a

238. McCoy et al., supra note 78, at 36 (citing Grosso v. Fid. Nat’l Title Ins. Co., 983 So. 2d 1165, 1169 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 2008)); Hartless v. Clorox Co., 273 F.R.D. 630, 649 (S.D. Cal. 2011) (approving incentive payouts
totaling $6,000); Walter v. Hughes Commc’ns, Inc., No. 09-2136 SC., 2011 WL 2650711, at *5 (N.D. Cal. July 6,
2011) (proposing incentive payouts of $5,000 for each named plaintiff); In re Ky. Grilled Chicken Coupon
Mktg. & Sales Practices Litig., 280 F.R.D. 364, 373 (N.D. Ill. 2011) (approving an aggregate incentive payment
of $25,000 for five named plaintiffs); Kelly v. Phiten USA, Inc., 277 F.R.D. 564, 572 (S.D. Iowa 2011)
(approving inventive payments of $3,000 for each named plaintiff). These incentive payments may be behind
the phenomenon of the “serial plaintiff,” which occurs when one party serves as the named plaintiff in multiple
class action litigations. See, e.g., Bruno v. Quten Research Inst., LLC, 280 F.R.D. 524, 534 (C.D. Cal. 2011),
reconsideration denied, 280 F.R.D. 540 (C.D. Cal. 2012) (noting that Bruno was a plaintiff in another class action
litigation); Montanez v. Gerber Childrenswear, LLC, No. CV 09–7420 DSF (DTBx), 2011 WL 6757875, at *5
(C.D. Cal. Dec. 15, 2011) (stating that the plaintiff class had a parallel law suit against the Defendant’s
competitor).
239. See Ellis, supra note 41, at 76 (noting an advantage of class actions is that “[t]hey allow lawsuits to be
brought to right a wrong where the interest of no single plaintiff would justify initiation of a lawsuit” and that a
disadvantage of class actions is that “they allow lawsuits to be brought when the interest of no single plaintiff
would justify a lawsuit”).
240. See Walter, 2011 WL 2650711, at *10 (“While it is true that the settlement contemplates awards of $5
and $40 to class members who return a claim form, the named plaintiffs seek $5,000, a considerably higher
amount. If this $5,000 figure represents a potential recovery at trial, then the class’s claims may be large enough
to justify individual actions.”).
241. See John P. Hooper, How Class Action Litigations Have Changed Advertising Campaigns, 1083 PLI/PAT
255, 257 (Mar. 2012) (citing Campbell’s Labeling Fight Feared to Embolden Class-Action Attorneys,
AdvertisingAge (May 8, 2011)); see also id. at 258 (“The landscape has changed in light of the hyper-scrutiny of
the plaintiffs’ bar of any and all claims made regarding product efficacy.”).
242. See Lanham Act, Pub. L. No. 79–489, 60 Stat. 427 (1946) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1051 et
seq. (2006)); see also Colligan v. Activities Club of N.Y., Ltd., 442 F.2d 686, 693 (2d Cir. 1971); Serbin v. Ziebart
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flood of litigation — a concern CAFA shows is no longer pressing.243 Some
defendants have argued successfully244 that consumer complaints about deceptive or
misleading advertising have been preempted by the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic
Act245 and the Nutrition Labeling and Education Act of 1990.246 Allowing such
preemption would allow federal law to occupy the field. Nationwide classes could
be certified more easily and the litigations could be resolved more efficiently.
However, most plaintiffs have been unsuccessful in making this argument.247
Even if the federal statutes were altered to preempt state deceptive advertising
causes of action explicitly, the question remains whether or not Rule 23 is equipped
to handle these cases at all. Class actions were never designed to address deceptive
advertising style causes of action. The notes to Rule 23 indicate that it was
contemplated to be of use in situations such as actions by shareholders against a
corporation; actions by bondholders against the bond’s municipality;
discrimination actions brought by the discriminated class; and antitrust and
licensing disputes.248 When Rule 23 was overhauled in 1966, the committee
contemplated the challenges of using the rule to vindicate a vast fraudulent act:
[A] fraud perpetrated on numerous persons by the use of similar
misrepresentations may be an appealing situation for a class action, and it
may remain so despite the need, if liability is found, for separate
determination of the damages suffered by individuals within the class. On
the other hand, although having some common core, a fraud case may be
unsuited for treatment as a class action if there was material variation in
the. . . kinds or degrees of reliance by the persons to whom they were
addressed.249

Int’l Corp., No. 92-1762, 1992 WL 415248, at *2 (W.D. Pa. Oct. 21, 1999)); Hooper, supra note 241, at 260
(citing Kelli L. Sager, Recent Developments in Defamation, Invasion of Privacy, and Other Content-Based Claims,
1069 PLI/PAT 15, 44 (Nov. 2011)).
243. See, e.g., Andreeva, supra note 43, at 390 (stating that CAFA gave federal courts original jurisdiction
over large class action lawsuits).
244. See Yumul v. Smart Balance, Inc., No. CV 10-00927 MMM (AJWx), 2011 WL 1045555, at *9–10 (C.D.
Cal. Mar. 14, 2011).
245. 21 U.S.C. § 301, et seq. (2006).
246. 21 U.S.C. § 343(r), et seq. (2006).
247. See Holk v. Snapple Beverage Corp., 575 F.3d 329, 336–42 (3d Cir. 2009) (reversing the district court
decision that the cause of action was preempted by the FDCA); Chavez v. Blue Sky Natural Beverage, 268 F.R.D.
365, 372 (“Although . . . the regulations promulgated by the FDA may raise an inference that federal law
preempts individual state laws governing food labeling, defendants have not met their burden to demonstrate
‘clear and manifest’ intent by Congress to occupy the entire field of food labeling so as to preempt state
consumer protection laws which are traditionally within the realm of state police power.”).
248. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23 advisory committee’s note 1937 (2006), advisory committee’s note 1966 (2006).
249. FED. R. CIV. P. 23 advisory committee’s note 1966 (2006) (amending subdivision (b)(3)) (citing
Oppenheimer v. F. J. Young & Co., 144 F.2d 387, 390 (2d Cir. 1944); Miller v. Nat’l City Bank of N.Y., 166 F.2d
723, 728 (2d Cir. 1948); Hughes v. Encyclopaedia Britannica, 199 F.2d 295 (7th Cir. 1952); Sturgeon v. Great
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In fact, some state causes of action for deceptive advertising, perhaps recognizing
the undesirability of the class action vehicle, preclude class actions altogether.250
It may make the most sense to fully restore deceptive advertising to its
government regulatory roots. The major benefit to a class action, as commentators
have noted, is the fact that it encourages consumers to act as private attorneys
general.251 As the Supreme Court has recognized, “The aggregation of individual
claims in the context of a class-wide suit is an evolutionary response to the existence
of injuries unremedied by the regulatory action of government.”252 But is there any
need for such activity in a field as heavily regulated as advertising already is? What
does the existence of a private cause of action for deceptive advertising actually
accomplish that is of use in society? The persistently small number of consumers
bothering to claim their damages for such acts seems to indicate a general
indifference to the lawsuit from the very people whose interests it is supposedly
vindicating.253
The reasoning behind separate state consumer protection laws makes little sense
in the modern day and age. Courts have attempted to continue to defend these
laws, pointing to each state’s individual interests in making sure its consumers are
protected.254 However, in defending choice of law principles that permit each state
to establish protection for its consumers, the courts merely highlight the absurdity
of the system. As the courts note, it is possible for companies to pick and choose the
consumer protection laws they prefer by locating where the consumer protection
laws are most lax.255 In the same way, the converse is true: it is possible for plaintiffs’
attorneys to pick and choose where to bring causes of action based on where the
consumer protection laws are most favorable. One court queried:
Does anyone think that, if State A opted to attract telemarketing companies
to its borders by diluting or for that matter eliminating any regulation of

Lakes Steel Corp., 143 F.2d 819, 822 (6th Cir. 1944)). Interestingly, the committee also raised reservations about
mass tort actions, another favorite class action of today. See id.
250. See Hooper, supra note 241, at 260 (citing Ryan P. O’Quinn & Thomas Watterson, Fair Is Fair:
Reshaping Alaska’s Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Act, 28 ALASKA L. REV. 295, 307 n.86 (2011));
Mazza v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 666 F.3d 581, 597–98 (C.D. Cal. 2012) (Nelson, J., dissenting) (“Louisiana,
Georgia, Mississippi, Kentucky, Virginia and Alabama prohibit class actions that allege unfair trade practices
under state law.”); Gianino v. Alacer Corp., 846 F. Supp. 2d 1096, 1101 (C.D. Cal. 2012) (noting that “some
states do not permit class actions under their consumer protection laws”).
251. See Ellis, supra note 41, at 111.
252. Deposit Guar. Nat’l Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 339 (1980).
253. Walter v. Hughes Commc’ns, Inc., No. 09-2136 SC., 2011 WL 2650711, at *13 (N.D. Cal. July 6, 2011)
(noting that “average claims submission rates . . . are typically ten percent or less”).
254. See Pilgrim v. Universal Health Card, LLC, 660 F.3d 943, 946–47 (6th Cir. 2011); see also Mazza, 666
F.3d at 591 (“Consumer protection laws are a creature of the state in which they are fashioned. They may
impose or not impose liability depending on policy choices made by state legislatures or, if legislators left a gap
or ambiguity, by state supreme courts.”).
255. See Pilgrim, 660 F.3d at 947.
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them, the policy makers of State B would be comfortable with the
application of the “consumer-protection” laws of State A to their residents
— the denizens of State B?256
But the absurdity of this outcome is rooted in the presupposition that consumer
protection laws should be merely statewide in scope. In this age of nationwide
advertising campaigns, the continuing statewide nature of deceptive advertising
causes of action not only seems inefficient but also seems to play little role in the
pursuit of anything approaching justice. One court chided a Defendant, “Try as it
might, General Mills cannot evade the unmistakable fact that the objective — and
realization — of its marketing campaign was to present Yo-Plus to Florida
consumers as a product that . . . aids in the promotion of digestive health.”257 But
that was not Defendant’s objective. Defendant’s objective was to present it that way
to U.S. consumers.258 The courts raise the specter of the ridiculousness of one state’s
consumer protection statute covering the entire nation.259 But the courts have hit on
the problem: both plaintiffs and defendants seem to behave as if they desire this to
be the case, favoring nationwide classes in many instances, and the lack of a
nationwide consumer protection law is harming judicial efficiency and consumer
protection precedent.260
Another oft-cited purpose of class actions is to deter corporate action (rather
than compensate for individual harm).261 However, most of the deceptive
advertising class actions have been aimed at industries whose advertisements are
already government-regulated.262 The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) has
approved many of the advertisements that are sought to be vindicated by deceptive
advertising causes of action. Oversight and regulation by federal agencies is the best
vehicle for fixing these shortcomings.263 The federal courts have implied as much,

256. Id.
257. Fitzpatrick v. Gen. Mills, Inc., 263 F.R.D. 687, 697 (S.D. Fla. 2010).
258. Id. at 691.
259. See Pilgrim, 660 F.3d at 947 (“[T]he idea that ‘one state’s law would apply to claims by consumers
throughout the country—not just those in Indiana, but also those in California, New Jersey, and Mississippi—is
a novelty.’” (quoting In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 288 F.3d 1012, 1016 (7th Cir. 2002))).
260. See id. at 948 (acknowledging that different consumer protection laws can require corporations to
have to use different advertisements in each state).
261. See Andreeva, supra note 43, at 400 (“[C]lass actions do not exist only to provide relief for private
wrongs – another major purpose behind them is to correct, punish, and deter big corporations.”) (citing David
L. Shapiro, Class Actions: The Class as Party and Client, 73 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 913, 924 (1998); 151 CONG.
REC. H736 (daily ed. Feb. 17 2005) (statement of Rep. Scott); id. at H751 (2005) (statement of Rep. JacksonLee)).
262. See Hooper, supra note 241, at 257.
263. See, e.g., Schering-Plough Healthcare Prods., Inc. v. Schwarz Pharma, Inc., 586 F.3d 500, 508–09 (7th
Cir. 2009) (“The FDA should be given a chance to opine on the proper labeling before a Lanham Act suit is
filed . . . since it has more experience with consumers’ understanding of drug labels than judges do.”).
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stepping aside when the issue in dispute intruded on the FDA’s territory.264 So
closely related are the FDA’s actions to deceptive advertising class actions, it seems
as if some class actions spring up as a result of the FDA action alerting the
consumers (or attorneys) to the problem.265 Defendants raise defenses based on
FDA requirements.266 If the FDA explicitly does not consider a label problematic,
why should defendant be prosecuted for it? Even the Better Business Bureau has
some power over advertising campaigns, spurring changes when its National
Advertising Division concludes a statement is deceptive or misleading.267
Furthermore, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has been granted broad
powers to regulate deceptive advertising268 and has been active in this mission,
providing a “comprehensive policy statement on ‘deception,’ its elements and how
it is to be evaluated.”269 Basically, the FTC itself has the power “to bring a class
action” on behalf of consumers injured by deceptive advertising.270 Courts have
already acknowledged the vital influence of the FTC’s regulations on private
deceptive advertising causes of action.271 And, like the FDA, the FTC sometimes
seems to flag deceptive advertising cases for private plaintiffs.272 Perhaps it would be
appropriate to move deceptive advertising back into the realm it was initially in: less
a private cause of action and more a matter for the government to handle.273

264. See id; see also All One God Faith, Inc. v. Hain Celestial Group, Inc., 93 U.S.P.Q.2d 1443, 1450 (N.D.
Cal. 2009) (stepping aside in favor of allowing the United States Department of Agriculture to exercise its
regulatory role properly).
265. See, e.g., In re Yasmin and Yaz Mktg. Sales Practices and Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 3:09–md–02100–
DRH–PMF, 2012 WL 865041, at *3 (S.D. Ill. Mar. 13, 2012) (stating that the FDA issued a warning letter to the
defendant concerning deceptive advertisements); Zeisel v. Diamond Foods, Inc., No. C 10-01192 JSW, 2011 WL
2221113, at *1 (N.D. Cal. June 7, 2011) (finding an FDA issued warning letter to be one of the factors that
instigated the suit).
266. See, e.g., Oshana v. Coca–Cola Co., 225 F.R.D. 575, 585 (N.D. Ill. 2005) (“Coca–Cola concludes issues
of proximate cause and actual deception under the Consumer Fraud Act require individual determinations
precluding typicality and class certification.”).
267. See Bruno v. Quten Research Inst., LLC, 280 F.R.D. 524, 529 (C.D. Cal. 2011) (noting that the Better
Business Bureau’s National Advertising Division found that the defendant’s advertising claims were not
supported.).
268. See FTC Act § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2006).
269. MCCARTHY, supra note 12, at § 27:117.
270. Id. at § 27:118.
271. See, e.g., B. Sanfield, Inc. v. Finlay Fine Jewelry Corp., 168 F.3d 967, 973 (7th Cir. 1999) (“[A]s the
administrative agency charged with preventing unfair trade practices, the Commission’s assessment of what
constitutes deceptive advertising commands deference from the judiciary.”).
272. See, e.g., Thompson v. Bayer Corp., No. 4:07CV00017 JMM, 2009 WL 2424352, at *1. (E.D. Ark. Aug.
6, 2009) (noting that the FTC issued an order to stop Defendant from making unsubstantiated representations
prior to Plaintiff suing).
273. Even some states initially saw deceptive advertising as a cause of action belonging to the state, not the
consumer. See Oshana v. Coca–Cola Co., 225 F.R.D. 575, 585 (N.D. Ill. 2005) (discussing how the Illinois
Consumer Fraud Act only provided for prosecutions by the state attorney general until 1973, when a private
cause of action was added to the statute).
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CAFA itself seems in favor of more government regulation of class actions in
general.274 Maybe deceptive advertising class actions should take this impulse one
step further and belong entirely to the government.

VI. Conclusion
For many years now, deceptive advertising class actions have enjoyed
unprecedented popularity.275 However, the state law nature of the cause of action
has led to persistent problems.276 The morass of settlement approval, inconsistent
precedent, limited statewide classes, and jurisdictional acrobatics have resulted in
inefficiency for plaintiffs, defendants, and courts — even after CAFA.277 It would be
better for deceptive advertising to leave behind fractured state statutes and tangled
class action procedure and return to the regulatory realm of its roots.278

274. See Erichson, supra note 45, at 1597 n.21 (noting that CAFA “requires notice of proposed class
settlements to government authorities”).
275. See supra Part I.
276. See supra Parts III.B–C.
277. See supra Part IV.
278. See supra Part V.
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